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INTRODUCTION

Retaliation in the workplace has been a subject of great interest to the
Supreme Court in recent years. The Court's 2009 decision in Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville' continued the favorable trend for
employees bringing employment retaliation claims under Title VII and other
federal statutes. In Crawford,the Court held that an employee who voluntarily
participates in an employer's internal investigation of a coworker's sexual
harassment claim has engaged in protected opposition conduct for purposes of
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.3 This decision comes on the heels of
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, another plaintiff-friendly
retaliation decision from the Court, establishing that em~loyer retaliation need
not relate to the plaintiff's employment to be actionable. These decisions have
any number of potential implications for federal employment discrimination
law and will undoubtedly continue to be the subject of considerable scholarly
debate over Title VII's proper role in prohibiting retaliation and discrimination.
But federal law is not the only source of protection for employees. In
addition to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other
protected characteristics, nearly every jurisdiction prohibits employers from
1. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
2. The Court's other recent decisions that are favorable for employee retaliation claims
are CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008); Gomez-Perezv. Potter, 128 S. Ct.
1931 (2008); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); and
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
3. Craiord,129 S. Ct. at 853.
4. Burlington N, 548 U.S. at 61.
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retaliating against employees who have made or supported a charge of
employment discrimination.5 Similarly, most states provide at least some
protection to employees who engage in protected whistleblower activity
regarding other forms of illegal or unethical workplace conduct.6
The desirability of having separate state employment laws has increasingly
emerged as the subject of debate.7 To be sure, the debate over the relative
benefits of federalism as applied to the workplace is a long one and, in some
sense, is simply part of a larger federalism debate. 8 However, in an era in which
Congress and the federal courts have failed to adequately protect individual
rights in the workplace, calls have increased for employees to turn more
frequently to state courts and legislatures to vindicate their rights.9
In contrast, other commentators-while certainly critical of the federal
courts' interpretation of federal employment law-have argued that having
entirely separate state and local employment laws dealing with the same subject
matter as covered by federal law injects unnecessary complexity into an already

5. See infra app. (categorizing the anti-retaliation statutes in existence at the state level).
6. Richard Moberly, ProtectingWhistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 975,
983-85 (2008).
7. See Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act Debate:
Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations Policy by Reforming Labor Law
Preemption DoctrinesCrafted by Judges a Half Century Ago, 19 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 9-17, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmx?
abstract -id-1374995) (arguing in favor of increased discussion of federalism issues in labor
law); Paul M. Secunda & Jeffr~ey M. Hirsch, Debate, Workplace Federalism, 157 U. PA. L. RFV.
PENNUMBRA~ 28 (2008), http://pennumbra.com/debates/Pdfs/WorkplaceFederalism.pdf
(debating what role, if any, states should play in regulating the workplace).
8. See Kirsten Engel, State andLocal Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating
State and Local Governments to Address a GlobalProblem and What Does This Say About
Federalismand EnvironmentalLaw?, 38 URn. LAw. 10 15 (2006) (discussing federalism issues
in the context of global warming); Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of
Fairness,30 VAL. U. L. REv. 459 (1996) (criticizing state constitutionalism).
9. See Drummonds, supra note 7, at 57-59 (citing state experimentation in the area of
preventing status discrimination as an argument in favor of increased state involvement in labor
law matters); Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. &
C.R. 187, 193 (2008) (stating that after a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Americans with Disabilities Act's definition of disability in a restrictive fashion, the focus of
disability rights advocates shifted to "trying to change the definition of disability in state laws");
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. PocKET PART 225, 225
(2008), http://www.yalelawj ourmal.org/imnages/Pdfs/659.pdf [hereinafter Hirsch, Taking States]
(noting the "recent movement to ... increas[e] states' power to regulate the workplace"). See
generally Sandra F. Sperino, Diminishing Deference: Learning Lessons from Recent
CongressionalRejection of the Supreme Court'sInterpretationof DiscriminationStatutes, 33
RuTGERs L. REc. 40, 40 (2009) (arguing that "blind adherence to federal interpretations of
discrimination principles on state employment discrimination claims is not only often
inappropriate, but also has seriously impacted the development of employment discrimination
law").
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complicated area.' 0 As a result, courts, employers, and employees are forced to
navigate their way through the "[literally hundreds of federal, state, and local
laws [that] may apply to a given workplace.""' Critics are skeptical of the idea
that state experimentation with new approaches to old problems can lead to
national reform, and argue that there is little meaningful experimentation taking
place.'12 Instead, states simply adopt modest variations on well-established
themes, adding little to the federal approach but confusion.'13 Indeed, critics
have charged that the benefits of a federal system are championed most loudly
when federal law is perceived to provide inadequate protection for individual
rights. But when federal law eventually changes course and provides greater
protection for individual rights, the benefits of having multiple and possibly

competing state standards pale in comparison to the resulting

Costs. 14

On its face, the Supreme Court's recent string of retaliation decisions,
culminating with Crawford,would seem to add anmmunition to those who see
"little advantage to this cacophony of rules" and little role for states to play in
protecting individual rights in the workplace.' 5 Unlike many of the Supreme
Court's employment discrimination decisions over the past two decades, its
recent retaliation decisions have produced victories for employees and,
consequently, broadened the reach of federal employment discrimination
statutes.'16 In light of this trend, proponents of individual rights in the workplace
might well ask whether the benefits, if any, associated with having separate
state and federal approaches to employment retaliation outweigh the resulting
costs.
The language of most state anti-retaliation statutes parallels, at least
roughly, the language of § 704(a) of Title VII. 17 In many jurisdictions, courts
have announced a policy of construing the language of these statutes in a
manner identical to the federal courts' interpretation of § 704(a) when

10. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Revolution in PragmatistClothing:Nationalizing Workplace Law,
61 ALA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17-32, availableat http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1 329522) [hereinafter Hirsch, Revolution in PragmatistClothing];
Secunda & Hirsch, supra note 7, at 35-40.
11. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. Ruv.
89, 89 (2008) [hereinafter Hirsch, The Law of Termination].
12. See Hirsch, Taking States, supranote 9, at 228-29 ("With a few exceptions, however,
states are not experimenting with new workplace policies.").
13. See id. at 229 ("[States] are instead picking from a menu of well-known options, and
there is little evidence that state regulation has or will result in more effective workplace
policies.").
14. See id at 227 (arguing that increased reliance on state law in response to perceived
shortcomings of federal law is short-sighted in light of the fact that federal law may shift in
employees' favor). See generally Kahn, supranote 8, at 464 (stating that state constitutionalism
has been fueled by forum shopping).
15. Hirsch, Revolution in PragmatistClothing, supra note 10, at 19.
16. See infraPart H.
17. See infra app., tbls. I-Ill.
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feasible.'18 Not surprisingly, some of these jurisdictions have already relied on
Crawford and Burlington Northern to bring their interpretations of their own
statutes in line with federal law.' 9 This has also been the general tendency of
state courts when dealing with other state employment discrimination statutes
that parallel federal law .20 Therefore, one might argue that the only likely
implication of the pro-employee outcomes in Crawford and other recent
Supreme Court retaliation decisions is the increased irrelevance of state
employment law in this area.
However, I submit that a closer examination of the implications of
Crawford, Burlington Northern, and other recent Supreme Court retaliation
decisions actually highlights some of the potential benefits of having separate
state and federal laws in place to govern the workplace. Specifically, when one
explores the issues that remain unresolved after Crawford and Burlington
Northern, one can see the potential for complementary state anti-retaliation
statutes to serve as a safety net to protect employees who are unfairly left
without protection from, retaliation under federal law. Moreover, the optimist in
me would lie to believe that the Court's recent retaliation decisions have the
potential to inspire state courts and legislatures to better recognize the benefits
of internal whistleblowing and, thus, expand the protection provided by the
common law theory of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy and
corresponding whistleblower protection statutes.
Part I of this article briefly explains the situations where having separate
state and federal employment laws are beneficial. Part 11 briefly discusses the
Court's recent Title VII retaliation decisions. Part III then analyzes some of the
unresolved legal issues surrounding federal retaliation claims after Crawford
and Burlington Northern, the implications of those decisions for the
interpretation of state anti-retaliation statutes, and the extent to which state law
might provide either an alternative remedy for employees or a model for federal
reform. Finally, Part IV discusses the potential for Crawfordand the Court's
other retaliation decisions to inspire state courts and legislatures to expand
protection for internal whistleblowers.
1. THE ARGUMENT, BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED

Stated as briefly as possible, my argument is that the benefits of having
separate state and federal employment discrimination laws outweigh the
resultant costs, a point illustrated by the current issues surrounding employment
retaliation claims. This does not mean, however, that the development of
18. See, e.g., Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790,
802 (Ky. 2004); Kletscbka v. Abbott-Nw. Hosp., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Tenn. 2007); Hanlon v. Chambers, 464 S.E.2d
741, 754 (W. Va. 1995).
19. See infra notes 87, 111 and accompanying text.
20. Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track.:DivergentInterpretationsof

State and FederalEmployment DiscriminationStatutes, 40

GA. L. R~v.

469, 477 (2006).
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multiple legal standards through state and federal judicial decisions is desirable.
My argument proceeds from the assumption that uniformity between state and
federal employment law is, in general, a good thing for all of the reasons
previously suggested. Therefore, state courts should, where feasible, interpret
parallel state statutes in a manner consistent with established federal law.
With this condition in place, I argue that there are several benefits to having
separate state and federal workplace discrimination laws. One benefit concerns
the role state courts may play in shaping the ongoing dialogue concerning
individual rights in the workplace. Where a state court is interpreting and
applying state statutory language that is essentially identical or at least similar
to that of a federal statute, the state court's independent review can contribute
to the overall quality of analysis concerning the proper interpretation and
application of the relevant statutory language. Admittedly, state law decisions
have, to date, had little influence on federal courts' interpretations of parallel
federal employment discrimination statutes. However, there is at least some
reason to think that state court retaliation decisions could influence federal
court decision-making if state courts were willing to view themselves as equal
participants in the debates surrounding the interpretation of anti-retaliation
statutes.
For one thing, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of retaliation
charges to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in recent
years .2 ' Given the fact that most states have anti-retaliation statutes that at least
roughly parallel federal law, there will almost certainly be a concomitant rise in
state retaliation claims-assuming one has not already taken place. As a result,
federal courts sitting in diversity will increasingly be required to apply state
decisional law interpreting parallel state anti-retaliation provisions. Thus, state
court decisions have the potential to influence federal courts, notjust within the
narrow confines of the instant case but with regard to retaliation law more
generally.
Traditionally, state courts have deferred not only to the federal courts'
interpretation of statutes governing the workplace, but also to the gloss or
application that has been adopted as well. For example, as decisional law
developed around the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), federal courts frequently stated that the statutes were
designed to protect only the "truly disabled" and that allowing individuals with
"minor impairments" to claim coverage would debase the noble purposes of
these laws. 2 In concluding that an individual did not have a disability under the
Acts, federal courts have far too often substituted this interpretive gloss for an
in-depth analysis of whether an individual's physical or mental impairment
substantially limited the individual in a major life activity. In fact, the Supreme
Court eventually adopted this interpretive gloss when it announced that the
21. Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Are We There Yet? Forty Years After the
Passage ofthe CivilRights Act: Revolution in the Workforce and the Unfulfilled Promisesthat

Remain, 22

HOFsTRA LAB.

& Emp. L.J. 627, 658 (2005).

22. See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
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tenms of the ADA's definition of disability "need[ed] to be interpreted strictly
to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled."2
In applying their states' own similarly- or identically-worded statutes, state
courts soon began repeating the "truly disabled" and "demanding standard"
mantras in their opinions, and, likewise, often substituted the mantras in place
of any meaningful analysis of whether a plaintiff actually met the statutory

definition of disability. 24 One notable exception to this trend was

Massachusetts's rejection of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADA for
use in its virtually identical state disability discrimination statute. 25 In a 2001
decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court directly confronted some
of the SU reme Court's more debatable conclusions about the ADA's
language. However, in the absence of similar decisions challenging the
federal orthodoxy, federal courts have never truly been forced to reexamine
some of their underlying conclusions about the purpose and language of the
ADA.
This is unfortunate. Where no clear federal standard has emerged on an
issue or where the debate as to the proper application of a settled standard is
ongoing, s~ate courts can play a beneficial role in shaping the debate. Rather
than engaging in the type of "Pavlovian response" to federal opinions that has
sometimes characterized state court decision making, 27 State courts should be
willing to conduct a rigorous analysis of the pertinent issues. Such an approach
can only contribute to the overall analytical quality of interpretation among
state and federal courts. As this article argues, employment retaliation law is
one field in which the federal courts could benefit from additional sources of
analysis.
Consistent with traditional federalism arguments, states can also serve as
role models for federal reform. State legislatures have only infrequently
experimented in the field of employment discrimination law; however, they
have actually been ahead of Congress in terms of addressing employment
discrimination and its attendant problems in several instances, such as
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.2 As another
23. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
24. See, e.g., Shangri-La Ltd. P'ship v. Meade, 955 A.2d 834, 839 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2008) (referencing the Supreme Court's "demanding standard" language in support of its
conclusion that a child with a latex allergy did not have a disability); Chiles v. Mach. Shop, Inc.,
606 N.W.2d 398, 409 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that allowing individuals with common
ailments to claim coverage "would undermine the purpose of the act itself, which was to assure
that the 'truly disabled' will not face discrimination because of stereotypes"); Morrison v.
Pinkerton Inc., 7 S.W.3d 851, 857 (Tex. App. 1999) ("Finding [plaintiffs] obesity to be a
disability would thus trivialize the impairments of those who are truly disabled and suffering
discrimination.").
25. Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 963-64 (Mass. 2001).
26. Id
27. Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 538 S.E.2d 389, 410 (W. Va. 2000) (McGraw, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Drummonds, supra note 7, at 58.
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example, some disability rights advocates who were involved in the process of
amending the ADA in 2008 to include a broader definition of disability
supported their cause by pointing to state statutes containing similarly broad
definitions. 29 Indeed, as this article attempts to demonstrate, numerous gaps
exist in the coverage of Title Vil's anti-retaliation provision that leave
deserving individuals unprotected. Thus, this is an area in which states can and
should experiment with new approaches to the problem of workplace
retaliation.
A final benefit of having separate state and federal regulations pertaining to
the workplace is that Supreme Court decisions can indirectly influence state
courts in areas traditionally left to state regulation. Thus far, Congress has been
unwilling to craft expanded legislation to provide protection for whistleblowers
in the private workplace. Where Congress has provided whistleblower
protection, it has done so in something of a jpiecemea1 fashion, providing
safeguards only in certain occupations or areas." Hence, states have generally
been left to adopt broader whistleblower protection standards, both in the form
of statutes and common law claims of retaliatory discharge in violation of
public policy. The Supreme Court's recent decisions involving Title VII are not
whistleblower cases in the way one ordinarily thinks of these cases.
Nevertheless, employment retaliation cases and traditional whistleblower cases
both involve a similar set of operative facts: an employee faces reprisal after
complaining about or calling attention to the employer's allegedly unlawful
behavior. To the extent the Supreme Court's recent Title VII decisions address
the benefits of protecting individuals who raise internal concerns about
unlawful employer behavior, they may prove instructive as state courts consider
their own whistleblower statutes or decisional law involving retaliatory
discharge. Thus, this article argues that the Supreme Court's recent retaliation
decisions help illustrate the potential for feder-al law to positively influence state
law in an area Congress has traditionally left the states to address.

29. See Claudia Center & Andrew J.Imparato, Redefining "Disability "Discrimination: A
Proposalto Restore Civil Rights Protectionsfor All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 32 1.
335-42 (2003). Andrew Imparato is president and CEO of the American Association of People
with Disabilities, "one of the organizations that worked to get the [ADA Amendments Act]
passed." Allison Torres Burtka, ADA Amendments Take Effect, Broadening Disability
Protections, TRIAL, Jan. 2009, at 14.
30. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006) (providing whistleblower protection under the
Clean Air Act).
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II. THIE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT RETALIATION DECISIONS AND THE
CURRENT STATE OF EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION CLAIMS AT THE FEDERAL
LEVEL

A. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, the Court held that
Title V11's anti-retaliation provision prohibits not just adverse employmentrelated actions, but any action that might "dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination. 3 1 The case involved an
employee who, after complaining internally about alleged sex discrimination,
was transferred to a less desirable position, albeit one that did not amount to a
demotion. 32 The Court faced the questions of "whether Title V11's antiretaliation provision forbids only those employer actions and resulting harms
that are related to employment or the workplace" and how substantial those
harms must be in order to be actionable.3
In reaching its decision, the Court had to choose between several standards
in use among the federal circuits. Some circuits required that the retaliation
must "'resul[t] in an adverse effect on the "terms, conditions, or benefits" of
employment"' to be actionable. 34 Other circuits went fuirther and adopted an
"4ultimate employment decisio[n] standard, which limits actionable retaliatory
conduct to acts such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating. ,35 In the end, the Court rejected these standards, instead holding
that, to be actionable, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, 'which in this context
means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination. ,36 However, the challenged action need
not affect the employee's job.3
The Court relied on both Title Vii1's statutory text and underlying policy
values to support its conclusion. Title Vii's anti-discrimination provision, §
703(a), defines actionable conduct with reference to hiring, firing, or other
forms of discrimination "with respect to [the] compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of [an individual's] employment." 3 In contrast, § 704(a), Title
31. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
32. Id. at 80 (Alito, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 61 (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 60 (alteration in original) (setting out the standard followed by the Third,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
35. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (some
internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 63 ("An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions
not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.").
38. Id. at 62. Pertaining to employers, the anti-discrimination provision provides, in full,
the following:
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VU's anti-retaliation provision, omits any reference to hiring, firing, or "the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employmnent[,]" and, instead,
simply makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminateagainst any of his
employees or applicants for employment" because they have engaged in

protected

actiVity.39

The Court found Congress's omission of language

speaking directly to the impact of the employer's actions on employment as
significant for purposes of determining whether § 704(a) should be read to
prohibit retaliation that does not affect an employee's job.4
The Court also believed that, in light of the purposes of § 704(a), it would
make sense for Congress to prohibit non-employment related forms of
retaliation .4 1 Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, the Court explained, "seeks
to . . . prevent[] an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an
employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic
guarantees" of a workplace free from discrimination.4 Retaliation that impacts
an employee outside the confines of work, such as filing false criminal charges
against the employee,4 may be just as effective in deterring employees from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination as work-related reprisal."4
Therefore, the Court concluded that defining actionable retaliation in terms of
the likelihood that the retaliation would deter a reasonable employee from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination would be in keeping with Title
VII's statutory language and overarching purposes.4
B. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
In Crawfordv. MetropolitanGovernment offashville, the Court held that
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision extends not just to an employee who
speaks out about discrimination on her own initiative, but also to one who
"6answer[s] questions during an employer's internal investigation" of unlawful
discrimination . 46 Section 704(a) provides that it is unlawful for an "employer to
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 62-63.
Idat63-64.
Idat63.
See Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1996).
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63-64.
Idat 64, 67.
129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009).
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discriminate against any of his employees [or applicants for employment]..
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or . .. because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in an4 manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.'A
As interpreted by the courts, this provision contains two distinct clauses:
the opposition clause and the participation clause.4 The participation clause
protects employees who have made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in a formal proceeding authorized by Title VII. 49 In contrast, the opposition
clause protects employees who have engaged in less formal activity. To receive
protection under the opposition clause, an employee need not file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC or participate in a court proceeding. Instead, the
employee simply must "oppose" conduct that he or she reasonably and in good
faith believes to be unlawful under Title VII. 50 Therefore, opposition conduct
can take many forms, ranging from filing an internal complaint of
discrimination with the employer to expressing support of coworkers who have
filed formal charges of discrimination. 5 1
The plaintiff in Crawfordclaimed that her actions of answering questions
about past instances of discrimination involving a supervisor during the course
of an employer's internal investigation into similar complaints qualified as
protected opposition and participation conduct.5 Importantly, the plaintiff had
not voluntarily approached the employer with evidence concerning the
supervisor's discrimination. Instead, she provided the evidence in response to
the employer's questioning.5" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had
previously held that an employee must engage in "active, consistent 'opposing'
activities" to receive protection under the opposition clause.5 Because the
employer's questioning did not take place within the context of an EEOC or
court proceeding, the Sixth Circuit held that Crawford's actions did not fit
within the parameters of the participation clause.5 5
Relying on a dictionary definition of the word "oppose,"~ the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit, concluding that the plaintiff's "ostensibly disapproving
account of sexually obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee"

47.
48.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).

See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.
1989).
49. Id
50. See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1125 (8th Cir. 2006).
Numerous states have adopted the same standard. See, e.g., Bahr v. Capella University, 765
N.W.2d 428, 434, 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
51. See Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990).
52. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849-50 (2009).
53. Id at 849.
54. Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 F. App'x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004).
55. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 211 F. App'x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006).
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qualified as opposition to that behavior. 56 The Court drew support for its
conclusion from an EEOC guideline, which explained that "[w]hen an
employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged
in . .. a form of employment discrimination, that communication virtually
always constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity."5 Because the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs actions were protected under the opposition
clause, it chose not to examine whether her conduct might also be covered
under the participation clause.5
C. CBOC S West, Inc. v. Humphries, Gomez-Perez v. Potter, and Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education
In three other cases decided between 2005 arnd 2008, the Court recognized
retaliation claims brought pursuant to statutes that do not explicitly contain
anti-retaliation provisions. In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Court held
that § 198 1(a) prohibited retaliation against an employee who complained to his
employer about race discrimination that was directed at another employee-a
prohibition not explicit in the statutory language. 59 In Gomez-Perez v. Potter,
the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
prohibits retaliation against federal workers who file administrative complaints
of age discrimination with the EEOC-once again in the absence of any
express statutory prohibition of retaliation. 60 Finally, the Court held in Jackson
v. Birmingham Board of Education that an employee who complained to his
employer about sex discrimination alleged to be in violation of Title IX was
protected from retaliation, despite the absence of any express anti-retaliation
6
provision within Title IX. 1

III. UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S RETALIATION DECISIONS
A. The Reach of Burlington Northern: What Qualifies as Prohibited
Retaliation?
One issue that is still developing involves how courts will interpret and
apply the Supreme Court's "material adversity standard" set out in Burlington
Northern. In explaining when retaliation is actionable, the Court attempted to
draw a line between "petty slights or minor annoyances" and "actions that are
likely 'to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,' the

56. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850-5 1, rev'g Crawford, 211 F. App'x 373.
57. Id. at 851 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id at 853.

59. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008).
60.
61.

Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008).
Jackson v. Birmingham Rd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183-84 (2005).
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courts, and their employers." 62 Yet, predicting on which side of that line an
employer's actions may fall in a given case can prove difficult. 6 ' Like the
federal courts, state courts are slowly starting to confront similar issues when
interpreting their own discrimination statutes.
1. Unresolved Issues Under Title VII: Federal Courts' Interpretation and
Application of the Material Adversity Standard
There is at least some reason to suspect that employers will continue to
enjoy a fair degree of latitude in retaliating against employees who oppose
unlawful discrimination even after Burlington Northern. Professor Eric
Schnapper's study of Title VII retaliation cases in the year following
Burlington Northern led him to conclude that "[t]he lower courts have been
surprisingly receptive" to employers' arguments that various forms of
retaliation are still permitted, notwithstanding Burlinifon Northern's
articulation of the broader material adversity standard. For example,
Schnapper found that employees lost the majority of cases when the retaliation
did not result in a loss of wages and when a court treated the question of
whether the retaliation was actionable as one of law rather than fact.6
Therefore, despite the Supreme Court's clear instruction that an employee need
not suffer tangible harm for retaliation to be actionable, some courts continue to
impose this defacto requirement.6 Professors Deborah L. Brake and Joanna L.
Grossman have likewise argued that post-Burlington Northern decisions
"suggest that lower courts expect the reasonable employee to endure a
substantial degree of adversity for the sake of challenging discrimination. 67
In addition, some courts ap ear to be ignoring or misinterpreting other
aspects of the Court's decision. Although the Court stated that its material
adversity standard was an objective one, it noted that context was an important
factor for determining whether a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from

engaging in protected

activity. 69

As an example, the Court cited the case of a

change in work schedule: to many workers, such a change would not be
materially adverse, but to "a young mother with school-age children," the
62. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2009) (citations omitted).
63. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failureof Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859, 907 (2008) (referring to the Court's opinion as
"cryptic"); B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TuL. L. REv. 439,483 (2008) (discussing potential
issues under the Burlington Northern standard).
64. Eric Scbnapper, Burlington Northern v. White in the Lower Courts: An Interim
Report, Apr. 3, 2007, http:fllawprofessors.typepad.comlaborprof blog/2007/04/schnapperon.
ap.html.
65. Id. at 5.
66. See id at 2-3.
67. Brake & Grossman, supra note 63, at 908.
68. Schnapper, supra note 64, at 4-6.
69. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68-69 (2009).
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change might matter "enormously." 7 0 Brake and Grossman contend that this
aspect of Burlington Northern has been lost on many courts as they "pay little
heed to individual circumstances that mifht make certain employees especially
sensitive to particular adverse actions."
A related issue is the extent to which an employer may face liability for the
retaliatory harassment by employees of a coworker who has engaged in
protected activity. One commonly cited reason for the failure of employees to
complain about discrimination in the workplace is their fear that coworkers will
react negatively. 72 Coworker retaliation may take many forms, ranginF from
ostracism of the complaining employees to threats of physical violence.7 Thus,
the fear of coworker retaliation may, in some instances, dissuade a reasonable
worker from complaining about unlawful discrimination. In some instances,
employers have directed their employees to retaliate against the complaining
employee.7 In others, coworkers have taken it upon themselves to retaliate
while their employers were aware of the conduct yet failed to put a stop to it.7 5
According to the pre-Burlington Northern view of some courts, only6
ultimate employment actions were actionable under a retaliation theory.
Therefore, because coworkers lack the authority to hire, fire, and deny
compensation, coworker harassment was not actionable.7 Burlington
Northern's rejection of the "ultimate employment decision" and "adverse
employment decision" standards 78 should open the door to more claims of
coworker retaliation. However, the Court's decision fails to address almost as
many issues as it resolves in the coworker retaliation arena.
Since Burlington Northern, the federal courts have announced differing
standards for employer liability in cases involving coworker retaliation. For
example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an employer may be
70. Id. at 69.
71. Brake & Grossman, supra note 63, at 909.
72. See, e.g., Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261,270 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that plaintiff's fear that she would be subjected to coworker retaliation if she made
internal complaints about sexual harassment, which was subsequently proven to be correct, did
not excuse her failure to take advantage of employer's internal complaint procedure); Rhonda
Reaves, RetaliatoryHarassment:Sex and the Hostile Coworker as the Enforcer of Workplace
Norms, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 403, 412 ("[RI isk of alienation or retaliation by peers impedes
victims' willingness to complain.").
73. See Christopher M. Courts, Note, An Adverse Employment Action-Not Just an
Unfriendly Place to Work: Co- Worker Retaliatory Harassment Under Title V1I, 87 IOWA L.
REv. 235, 236 (200 1) (providing examples of coworker retaliation).
74. See, e.g., Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 241-43 (4th Cur.
1997).

75. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76,82-83, 89 (1st Cur. 2005) (holding
that employer may be liable for coworker retaliatory harassment if harassment is sufficiently
severe or pervasive and if employer tolerated harassment).
76. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
77. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cu. 1997).
78. See Reaves, supra note 72, at 425.
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liable for its failure to put a stop to severe or pervasive coworker harassment
where the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the retaliation and
"responded to the plaintiffs complaints so inadequately that the response
manifests indifference or unreasonableness under the circumstances."7 In
contrast, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that an employer is
only liable for coworker retaliation where the employer's80failure to stop the
conduct was because of the plaintiff s protected activities.
Also unclear is how severe the coworker retaliation must be in order to be
actionable. In seeking to explain its material adversity standard, the Court stated
that "petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners" will
ordinarily not suffice. 8 ' In support of this idea, the Court quoted a treatise
noting "courts have held that. .. 'snubbing' by supervisors and co-workers [is]
not actionable under § 704(a)."8 As a general rule, the observation about
snubbing makes some sense. But extreme forms of supervisor or coworker
ostracism may be just as likely to dissuade a reasonable worker from
complaining about discrimination as more tangible forms of retaliation.8
Indeed, the Court spent considerable time in its decision explaining that context
is crucial when determining whether retaliation is significant enough to deter a
reasonable employee in the plaintiffs situation from complaining.84 Since
Burlington Northern, however, some courts have treated the Court's
"snubbing" reference not so much as a general rule of thumb which may or may
not be applicable depending upon the circumstances of a particular workplace,
but as something approaching a hard and fast rule. 85
It is important to note that despite the fact that it is a coworker retaliating in
these cases, the plaintiffs only remedy is against the employer. Individual
employees are not liable to other employees under Title VII. 8 6 Therefore, if a

79. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 347 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Moore
v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that employer may be liable for
coworker retaliation where it had actual or constructive knowledge and failed to take prompt
and adequate remedial action); cf Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d
100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[Elmployer liability for co-worker [sexual] harassment exists only if
the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or, alternatively, if the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and
appropriate remedial action.").
80. Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 619 (8th Cir. 2007).
81. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
82. Id (quoting 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATioN LAW
669 (3d ed. 1996) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
83. George, supra note 63, at 483.
84. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
85. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 63, at 910-11 (citing examples of significant
supervisor and coworker ostracism found to be not actionable following BurlingtonNorthern);
George, supra note 63, at 483 ("[L]ower courts since BurlingtonNorthern often have taken the
Court's dicta at face value.").
86. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cit. 1995).
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plaintiff is unable to recover from the employer, the plaintiff will most likely be
left without a remedy.
2. Implications for State Law and Possible Alternatives
a. State Anti-DiscriminationStatutes with Similar Language
In prohibiting retaliation against those who oppose unlawful
discrimination, many states employ statutory language that is identical or
almost identical to the language of § 704(a). 7 In other areas of federal
employment discrimination law, state courts have frequently followed the
Supreme Court's lead when interpreting parallel state statutes. 88 Therefore, if
prior experience is any guide, most states with comparable anti-retaliation
provisions can be expected to adopt Burlington Northern'smaterial adversity
standard when interpreting their own statutes. Indeed, several state appellate
courts have already done so, in some cases overruling prior precedent that
adopted an adverse or ultimate employment action standard.8
The fact that most state courts that have confronted this issue when
interpreting their own similarly worded statutes have chosen to follow the lead
of the Supreme Court does not mean that all will, however. In several
instances-most notably in the disability discrimination context-state courts
have chosen not to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of the relevant
federal employment discrimination statute when analyzing the similar state
counterpart. 90 In some cases, state courts appear to have simply disagreed with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal language and emphasized minor

87. See infra app., tbl.I.
88. Long, supra note 20, at 477.
89. Donovan v. Broward County Bd. of Comm'rs, 974 So. 2d 458, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); Hoffelt v. 1ll. Dep't of Human Rights, 867 N.E.2d 14, 19-2 1 (1ll. App. Ct. 2006);
Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 879 N.E.2d 174, 180 n.2 (Ohio 2007); Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d
803, 820 (Tenn. 2007); see also Roa v. Roa, 2010 WL 114284, at *8-9 (N.J. Jan. 14, 2010)
(citing Burlington Northern with approval and concluding that employer's cancellation of
employee's insurance coverage was actionable under New Jersey law).
90. Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 963-64 (Mass. 2001) (rejecting
Supreme Court's interpretation of Americans with Disabilities Act while interpreting parallel
state statute); Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 538 S.E.2d 389, 395 (W. Va. 2000) (stating that West
Virginia's Human Rights Act is independent of the corresponding federal anti-discrim-ination
statutes and merits independent analysis); see also Sangamon County Sheriff's Dep't v. Ill.
Human Rights Comm'n, 908 N.E.2d 39, 45-47 (Ill. 2009) (rejecting Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII for use in state sexual harassment statute and holding that an
employer is strictly liable for sexual harassment of a supervisory employee when the supervisory
employee has no authority to affect the terms and conditions of the complainant's employment);
Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co., 803 N.E.2d 781, 785-87 (Ohio 2004) (choosing not to adopt
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act for use in
state age discrimination statute).
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differences to support their departures. 9 1 Although they are still a distinct
minority, a handful of state appellate courts--either through a conscious
decision or inattention-have continued to reference the adverse employment
action standard that had been developed prior to Burlington Northern, even in
the face of the Supreme Court's more recent material adversity standard 9.
This is a situation in which the problems associated with having separate
federal and state standards outweigh any corresponding benefits. I have argued
in greater detail elsewhere that, generally speaking, parallel construction of
identical or similar state and federal statutory language is preferable. 93 This
preference is especially true in the case of employment retaliation statutes. A
state court that interprets language that is identical or nearly identical to the
language of § 704(a) to require something other than a materially adverse
action on the part of the employer injects an unnecessary degree of confusion
and complexity into the area. As the Burlington Northern Court observed,
nothing in the statutory language of § 704(a) requires that the employer's action
be linked to the terms and conditions of employment. 94 Thus, nothing compels
a state court writing on a clean slate to adopt either the adverse employment
action or ultimate employment action standards. Moreover, where a state court
has already adopted one of these standards and must decide whether to switch
to the Burlington Northern standard, the arguments in favor of applying the
principle of stare decisis are relatively weak because many jurisdictions
borrowed from federal law when drafting their own employment discrimination
laws. 95 Having originally borrowed from Title Vil's language, a state legislature
presumably intended that state law follow a reasonable federal standard
formulated by the Supreme Court. 96 Additionally, the material adversity
standard better promotes the underlying policies of anti-retaliation and antidiscrimination statutes than its counterparts. 97 Given a choice, then, between
the competing standards when interpreting state statutory language that is
identical or similar to § 704(a), state courts should choose the Burlington
Northern option.
91. See Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910,912 (Mich. 2000) (rejecting Supreme
Court's vicarious liability standard in Title VII cases for use in parallel state statute); see also
Long, supra note 20, at 554-56 (criticizing Chambers).
92. See Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. Martin, Nos. 2007-CA-001629-MR,
2007-CA-001803-MR, 2009 WL 1636270, at *4, *9 (Ky. Ct. App. June, 12,2009) (referencing
Burlington Northern's standard, but stating that in order to make out a prima fadie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant took an employment action adverse to
the plaintiff); Goodman v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., No. A.06-202, 2007 WL 46289, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2007) (citing Burlington Northern, but concluding that receiving a poor
performance review, being placed on a work plan, and being reassigned to a different division
were not adverse employment actions).
93. Long, supra note 20, at 523-39.
94. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62, 64 (2006).
95. Long, supra note 20, at 525-26.
96. Id. at 528.
97. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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Adopting Burlington Northern's material adversity standard for use in a
parallel state anti-retaliation statute would not necessarily render state law
redundant in this instance, however. If in fact the federal courts are not
faithfully applying the Supreme Court's framework, state courts may
sometimes prove a better forum for furthering the policies embodied in antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation law. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, state
courts can be expected to provide a more generous interpretation and
application of the material adversity standard than their federal counterparts. In
a few jurisdictions, statutes specifically direct courts to interpret the statutory
language in a liberal manner.9 Although the idea that, as a remedial measure,
Title Vil's language should be construed broadly is arguably implicit in the
interpretation of § 704(a), it is an idea that appears to occasionally get lost in
the shuffle in federal decisions. However, because some state antidiscrimination statutes directly incorporate this cannon of construction, state
courts have sometimes expressly relied on this language
when adopting more
9
protective retaliation or discrimination standards. 9
If there is a debate taking place as to the meaning of the Court's holding in
Burlington Northern, there is no reason why the state courts should not be part
of the debate. State judges too often have blindly adopted not only the
prevailing federal interpretation of employment discrimination law, but also the
federal courts' gloss or application of that law. 100 The potential for this same
problem exists with the Court's material adversity standard.' 0 ' Rather than
simply citing Burlington Northern for the proposition that coworker or
supervisor "snubbing" is generally not actionable, state courts should be willing
to dig deeper into the specific facts of a given case. For example, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals recently applied the material adversity standard and
concluded that a supervisor had retaliated against the plaintiff, a human
resources manager, by adversely modify'ing the duties and prestige of her
position after she supported other female employees who had been sexually
discriminated against. 1 02 Among the supervisor's actions were forms of reprisal
98. See, e.g., Allison v. Hous. Auth. of Seattle, 821 P.2d 34, 38 (Wash. 1991) ("Title VII
differs from R.C.W. 49.60 in that Title V11 does not contain a provision which requires liberal
construction for the accomplishment of its purposes.").
99. See Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956,962 (Mass. 2001) (noting that
Massachusetts's disability discrimination statute provides for liberal interpretation to justify
departure from the Supreme Court's interpretation of parallel ADA language); Allison, 821 P.2d
at 38 (relying on language in state statute requiring liberal construction as one reason for
adopting a more generous causation standard in discrimination cases).
100. See generally Long, supra note 20, at 480-81 (noting the criticisms of state courts'
"Pavlovian responses" to federal decisions).
101. See Montgomery County v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610,616 (Tex. 2007) (concluding that
whether a challenged act is materially adverse is ordinarily a question of law for the court);
Schnapper, supra note 64, at 4 (arguing that, contrary to BurlingtonNorthern, numerous federal
courts have held that whether a challenged act is materially adverse is ordinarily a question of
law).
102. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. Martin, Nos. 2007-CA-001629-NM
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that some federal courts might not recognize as actionable, including directing
other employees not to communicate with human resources and referring to the
plaintiff in a derogatory manner during staff meetings.10
Federal courts will increasingly be called upon to examine state decisional
law on workplace retaliation. Accordingly, state courts are well positioned to
influence federal decision making in this area. Rather than rely unquestioningly
on an approach taken by a few federal courts, state judges should be willing to
take a fresh look at the Burlington Northern opinion and apply its standard as
they deem appropriate. In so doing, they may perhaps provide innovative
insight and help develop a consensus as to the true import of the material
adversity standard. If there is indeed already uncertainty among the federal
courts as to Burlington Northern's true meaning, there is little harm and
potentially something to be gained by state courts entering the debate. As such,
they should be willing to act as coequal players in the interpretive game.
To the extent that state courts interpret and apply the Court's material
adversity standard more consistently with what appears to have been the
Court's intended meaning than some federal courts have, the benefits resulting
from having separate federal and state systems for addressing employment
retaliation outweigh any resulting complexity or other concerns in this instance.
b. State Anti-DiscriminationStatutes with Different Language
In a number of jurisdictions, Burlington Northern's material adversity
standard may add an element of uncertainty to workplace retaliation law. A
majority of jurisdictions employr anti-retaliation language that is noticeably
different than that of § 704(a).'0 Therefore, the BurlingtonNorthern standard
may present some courts with potentially difficult interpretational issues
stemming from differences in language between Title VII and state statutory
law.
In some jurisdictions, the difference in language is unlikely to present much
of an interpretive issue for courts. For example, some state statutes prohibit an
employer from retaliating "in any manner" or engaging in "any form of
reprisal" against a person who has engaged in protected activity. 05 This
2007-CA-001I803-MR, 2009 WL 1636270, at *1-2, *9 (Ky. Ct. App. June 12, 2009).
103. Id. at *9.
104. See infra app., tbl.II.

§ 4572(l)(E) (2002) (unlawful to "discriminate in any
§ 2 13.070(2) (2000) (unlawful to "retaliate or discriminate in any
manner"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-18 (Supp. 2009) (unlawful to "engage in any form of
threats, retaliation, or discrimination"); Oulo REv. CODE AiNN. § 4112.02(1) (LexisNexis 2007)
(unlawful to "discriminate in any manner"); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANJN. § 955(d) (West 2009)
(unlawful to "discriminate in any manner"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(5) (2003) (unlawful to
"discriminate in any manner"); S.D. CODIFID LAWS § 20-13-26 (2004) (unlawful to "directly or
105.

ME. REV. STAT. ANNm.
tit. 5,

manner"); Mo. REV.

STAT.

indirectly .. . engage in or threaten to engage in any reprisal, economic or otherwise"); TEN..
CODE ANNJ. § 4-21-301 (2005) (unlawful to "[rietaliate or discriminate in any manner); VT.
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language seems generally in keeping with BurlingtonNorthern's observation
that retaliation can take many forms and need not (and should not) be limited to
retaliation that impacts the terms and conditions of employment. Thus, these
kinds of differences in statutory language are unlikely to lead to competing
standards regarding what forms of retaliation are prohibited.'10
In a significant number of other jurisdictions, however, the statutory
prohibition on retaliation could legitimately be read to prohibit only adverse
employment actions or ultimate employment actions. In Burlington Northern,
the Court based its decision that retaliation need not be employment-related to
be actionable, in part, on the fact that, unlike Title VII's anti-discrimination
provision, § 704(a) does not specifically link employer retaliation to an
individual's employment.107 Some jurisdictions, however, define prohibited
retaliation specifically with reference to an individual's employment. As such,
Burlington Northern's material adversity standard may not apply.
For example, it is illegal under Delaware law "to discharge, refuse to hire
or otherwise discriminate against any individual or applicant for employment"
because of the individual's protected activity.108 This language ismore specific
than § 704(a)'s open-ended prohibition on discrimination.'10 Indeed, it is quite
similar to Title Vii1's anti-discrimination provision, § 703(a), which has been
held to apply only to employment-related activity."10 Under the canon of
ejusdem generis, inclusion of the catch-all "or otherwise discriminate"
provision at the end of a list of ultimate employment actions suggests an intent
to limit prohibited forms of retaliation to employment-related actions or,
perhaps, only ultimate employment actions."'
State courts are already beginning to confront this interpretive dilemma.
For example, Washington's employment discrimination statute makes it
unlawful "to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate" against an individual
who has engaged in protected activities,''12 but several state appellate court
tit. 21, § 495(a)(5) (2003) (unlawfuil to "discharge or in any other manner
discriminate"); W. VA. CODE § 5-i1i-9(7)(C) (2002) (unlawful to "[e]ngage in any form of
reprisal or otherwise discriminate"); Keeney v. Hereford Concrete Prods., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 622,
624-25 (Mo. 1995) (recognizing that Title VII's language is "considerably more limited" than
the Missouri Human Rights Act's "in any manner" language and that a plaintiff who "suffers
any damages due to an act of reprisal" may have a claim under state law) (emphasis added).
106. See Hughes v. Miller, 909 N.E.2d 642, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (adopting material
adversity standard for use with respect to Ohio's statute).
107. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62--64 (2006).
108. DEL. CODE ANNm.tit. 19, § 711 (f) (2005); see infra app., tbl.II (listing of states with
similar statutory language).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
110. See id. §2000e-2(a).
lIi. See Hall Street Associates. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404
(2008) ("Under [the ejusdem generis canon], when a statute sets out a series of specific items
ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the
specifics it follows.").
STAT. ANN.

112.

WASH. REV. CODE

§ 49.60.210(l) (2008).
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decisions have nonetheless utilized Burlington Northern's material adversity
standard."1 3 In contrast, in 2008 the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its
prior holding that in order for retaliation to be actionable under California' s
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the retaliation must materially
affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."14 It did so despite the
fact that at least one intermediate court of appeals had previously applied the
material adversity standard." 5
Unless there is a compelling reason to reject the material adversity
standard, the costs in terms of adding complexity and uncertainty of having
competing standards are too substantial to justify. In jurisdictions like
California, Washington, and Delaware, there is little question that the material
adversity standard better promotes the goals of employment discrimination law
than does the adverse or ultimate employment action standards. Properly
construed, the material adversity standard does not unduly limit the ability of
employers to interact with their employees.
And, although the California Supreme Court's interpretation of its statutory
language is certainly reasonable, it is not the only possible interpretation. Like
California's anti-retaliation provision, Title Vil's anti-discrimination provision
in § 703(a) prohibits an employer from failing to hire, discharging, or otherwise
discriminating against an individual."16 However, § 703(a) prohibits an
employer from otherwise discriminating specifically with respect to the
individual's "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."' F The antiretaliation provision of California's FEHA does 18not contain the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" qualifier." Moreover, even if a court
were inclined to follow the ejusdem generis canon, that interpretive tool might
not apply as it is employed in some jurisdictions. Some courts state that the
canon only applies when "a series of more than two items ends with a catchall
term."' 19 Thus, FEHA's statutory language does not point as strongly in favor

113. Tucker-Slater v. City of Lakewood, No. 3 6097-7-11, 2008 WL 2811129, at *7 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 22, 2008); Pedersen v. Snohomish County Ctr. for Battered Women, No. 602756-1, 2008 WL 1934846, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2008); Moon v. City of Bellevue, No.
59605-5-1, 2008 WL 176340, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 22,2008); see also Hoydic v. Genesco,
Inc., No. AAN-CV-07-5003291-S, 2008 WL 1914338, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2008)
(adopting Burlington Northern's material adversity standard despite fact that anti-retaliation
provision prohibits an employer from "discharg[ing], expel[ling] or otherwise discriminat[ing]
against any person" who has engaged in protected activity).
114. Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P'ship, 177 P.3d 232, 239 (Cal. 2008).
115. Taylor v. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 219 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006).
116. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
117. Id.
118. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 12940(h) (West 2005).
119. McQueen v. Shelby County, 730 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (emphasis

added) (quoting
(1975)).
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of an adverse or ultimate employment action standard as does the language of §
703(a).
Furthermore, as a matter of common sense, one should generally assume
that, absent strong evidence to the contrary, a legislature would prefer
uniformity in state and federal standards to avoid the confusion and complexity
that might emanate from conflicting guidelines. Therefore, unless there is
something in the legislative history or in the development of state law that
indicates an adverse legislative preference, jurisdictions like California should
adopt the material adversity standard for use in their own anti-retaliation
provisions.
c. The Special Case of Coworker Retaliation
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Burlington Northern that retaliation
need not relate to employment to be actionable under § 704(a) certainly
suggests that coworker retaliation could, in some instances, fall within the
purview of this standard. As a result, state courts may soon find themselves
faced with a choice between competing federal standards when coworker
retaliation subjects an employer to liability under a parallel state statute. 2
Again, this is a debate to which state courts may have something to contribute.
However, the rationale underlying Burlington Northern also raises an
interesting theoretical question about coworker retaliation that some
jurisdictions are dealing with on a practical level.
As the Supreme Court has suggested, the primary goal of anti-retaliation
measures is to insure that employees are not dissuaded from reporting unlawful
behavior. 12 1 If that is accurate, and if coworker retaliation may sometimes be as
effective a deterrent to raising concerns about discrimination as employer
retaliation, should liability for retaliation be limited to employers? Would the
possibility of both employer and individual liability better further the goals of
anti-retaliation measures than a system of employer liability alone?
Some jurisdictions have concluded that the statutory protection from
retaliation should not be limited to employers.122 Ohio's anti-retaliation law
makes it unlawful for "any person" to retaliate "in any manner" against another
120. Cf Janssen v. Rockville Ctr., 869 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(involving retaliation claim against employer based on employer's failure to take "any
affirmative or effective measures" to prevent coworker retaliation based on plaintiff's internal
complaints of harassment). See generallyMadejav. MiB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1044-45 (N.H.
2003) (concluding that employer may be held liable for coworker retaliation where employer
negligently failed to discover or remedy retaliation).
121. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2009) ("The
antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with 'unfettered access' to Title
VII's remedial mechanisms. It does so by prohibiting employer actions that are likely 'to deter
victim of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,' the courts, and their employers."
(citation omnitted)).
122. See infra app., tb.MI.
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who has engaged in protected activity.12' This language has been interpreted to
apply to coworker retaliation.124 A surprising number of other jurisdictions
employ similar language, thus raising an interpretive question as to whether
coworkers may be subject to liability for retaliation.12 5 For example, the antidiscrimination statutes of California and Washington use comparable language
in defining who may be held liable for retaliation. California makes it unlawful
"[flor any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person to
discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person" for engaging in
protected activity.12 6 Likewise, in Washington it is unlawful "for any employer,
employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or
27
otherwise discriminate against any person" for partaking in covered activity.1
However, the California Supreme Court has held that despite the inclusion of
the "or person" language, the statute only applies to employers. 128 Conversely, a
Washington appellate court has suggested that while coworkers may not be
held liable for retaliation, supervisors may since they, like employers, have the
29
power to "discharge"~ or "4expel.','1
To be sure, there are any number of potential concerns with exposing
supervisors and coworkers to the prospect of liability, not the least of which is
the potential disharnony that could result. But, in an age where retaliation
claims are on the rise, "0some sae'llowance for the possibility of individual
liability is an experiment worth monitoring.
d. State Wrongful Discharge Cases
Burlington Northern may ultimately influence not only states' statutory
frameworks for dealing with retaliation but state common law claims of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The chapter of the proposed
Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(l) (LexisNexis 2007).
124. Hughes v. Miller, 909 N.E.2d 642,647 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) ("Ohio's anti-retaliation
law has a broader scope than Title V11 because it does not limit its coverage to people in an
employer-employee situation. .. ); see also LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 777 F. Supp. 1378,
1381-82 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("Employing the common usage of the words in § 4112.02(l), no
employer-employee relationship is required.").
125. See infra app., tbl.III.
126. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(h) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
123.

127.

WASH. Ruv. CODE

§ 49.60.210(1) (2008) (emphasis added).

128. Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P'ship, 177 P.3d 232, 238 (Cal. 2008).
129. See Malo v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 965 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that language "is directed at entities functionally similar to employers who discriminate
by engaging in conduct similar to discharging or expelling a person who has" engaged in
protected activity and dismissing retaliation claim against coworker because he "did not employ,
manage or supervise" plaintiff).
130. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker'sFriend: RetaliationAgainst Thi rdPartiesandthe

Right ofAssociation in the Workplace, 59

FLA. L. REv.

931, 935 (2007) [hereinafter Long, The

Troublemaker's Friend] (noting that "retaliation claims have reportedly doubled in the last
decade").
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Restatement (Third) of Employment Law that deals with the common law tort
of wrongful discipline in violation of public policy discusses the types of
3
adverse employer actions that may form the basis of an employee's claim.'1 '
The fact that the authors termed the theory wrongful discipline in violation of
public policy, rather than wrongful dischargeis noteworthy. This is because, in
defining the tort, the authors adopted BurlingtonNorthern'smaterial adversity
standard, despite the fact that the majority of state courts that have previously
considered the issue have declined to extend the coverage of the tort to
employer actions not amounting to discharge or constructive discharge.132 Thus,
to the extent the proposed Restatement ultimately influences the development
of the common law of the workplace, the Supreme Court's Burlington
Northern decision may have an unintended positive effect on state law.
Moreover, because the wrongful discipline (or discharge) tort covers a variety
of unfair employer acts that are not addressed by federal law, the proposed
Restatement's rule illustrates some of the benefits of having separate state and
federal fr-ameworks in place and allowing them to influence each other.
B. The Extent of Coverage Under the Opposition and ParticipationClauses
for Participationin Internal Investigations
Crawford's holding that the protection of § 704(a)'s opposition clause
extends to employees who answer questions during an employer's internal
investigation of alleged discrimination will probably address most coverage
questions concerning this scenario. 133 However, from the perspective of an
employee participating in an internal investigation, it would have been
preferable had the Court resolved Crawford by holding that the plaintiffs
conduct was covered under § 704(a)'s participation clause. At present, at least
some future employees will be forced to seek protection under the more limited
opposition clause when their activity is more naturally classified as
participation conduct. As a result, they may find themselves covered by neither.
1. Unresolved Issues Under Title VII
As interpreted by the courts, the participation clause provides substantially
more coverage than does the opposition clause. It does so in several ways. First,
the participation clause protects more than just opposing unlawful practices,
making charges, or testifying in a Title VII1 proceeding; it also protects
employees who have "assisted[] or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchap~ter." 134 The "in any
manner" language is absent from the opposition clause. 15Thus, by its terms,
131.

REsTATEmENT (THRD) OF EmPoymENT LAw § 4.01

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id; see id. cmt.b (listing cases).
See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 850-51 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
See id. § 2000e-2(a).

(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
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the participation clause provides "exceptionally broad protection," according to
at least one court.'136 Asa result, the clause has been held to cover a variety of
actions, including helping coworkers file their own formal discrimination
complaints13 7 and returning to work early from maternity leave in an attempt to
help financially sugjort a flancd/coworker during the pendency of a
discrimination case.'
Unfortunately for employees who become involved in internal
investigations regarding unlawful discrimination, the federal courts have
consistently held that the participation clause only covers employee action
undertaken in conjunction with an investigation, proceeding, or hearing that is

authorized by Title

VII.13 9

Thus, the participation clause only, applies when

Title VII1's formal remedial mechanisms have been triggered.' 14 h Supreme
Court's refusal to consider whether the participation clause might also cover an
employee who participates in an internal investigation unconnected to any
EEOC or court proceeding leaves the majority rule intact. This refusal also has
the potential to leave some employees uncovered who have engaged in conduct
very much in keeping with the goals of Title VI' s anti-retaliation provision.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the benefits of internal investigation
and compliance procedures for dealing with discrimination complaints. In the
Court's view, "Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment
policies and effective grievance procedures" and was intended "to promote
conciliation rather than litigation .. .." Implementing an effective internal
grievance mechanism may also "encourage employees to report harassing
conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive."'4 To that end, the Court has
essentially required employees seeking to hold their employers vicariously
liable for the harassment of supervisors to take advantage of any internal

complaint procedure they may have before filing

Suit. 14

Indeed, this position

presents a persuasive argument for why participation in an internal
investigation should be considered protected participation in a Title VII
proceeding.'"4

136.
Pettway
137.
138.
139.

Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cu. 1989);
v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1969).
Eichman v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 597 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1979).
EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 329 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
Long, The Troublemaker's Friend, supra note 130, at 953-54.
140. See id
141. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).

142.
143.

Id.

See id. at 765 (articulating affirmative defense for employers involving consideration
of whether "employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any ...
harassing behavior" and whether "plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer").
144. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend, supra note 130, at 976-77; see also Aragon v.
Lazo, No. B204981, 2009 WL 81388, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009) (considering, but
rejecting similar argument made on state law grounds).
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Through its employment discrimination decisions, the Court has
emphasized that Title VII should be construed so as to encourage employees to
make internal reports of unlawful conduct and to likewise encourage employers
to deal with those reports in an effective manner.14' By extending the reach of
the opposition clause to an employee who provides information about unlawfuil
harassment during an internal investigation, Crawfordaids in this goal. But by
not extending the scope of the participation clause to cover certain kinds of
employee actions that facilitate internal grievance procedure but that do not
amount to "opposition," Congress and the courts have left a potentially large
gap in coverage.
Consider the case of the employee who assists a coworker with an internal
complaint.14 6 In Sawicki v. American Plastic Toys, Inc., a group of employees
brought their supervisor a memorandum detailing sexual harassment allegations
against another shift leader.'14 7 The supervisor then retyped the memorandum
for the employees, delivered it to the plant manager and the company's human
resources manager, and informed the plant manager that the employees had
consulted with an attorney. 18The
supervisor was later fired, allegedly in
retaliation for these actions.149 According to the district court, the participation
clause did not protect the supervisor because she did not "engag[e] the formal
machinery of government to seek redress for the sexual harassment alleged by
her coworkers." 50 Nor, in the court's view, did the supervisor engage in
protected opposition conduct.' 5 ' Had the supervisor signed the memorandum
detailing harassment or stated that she had consulted with an attorney on the
52
employees' behalf, her actions might have amounted to opposition conduct.1
But merely delivering the employees' memorandum did not demonstrate the
"opposition" needed to fit within the opposition clause.' 513
If the participation clause were to apply to internal grievances, the
supervisor's actions in Sawicki would almost certainly amount to participation
or assistance "in any manner." But if one must fit the supervisor's actions under
the heading of "opposing" unlawful conduct, there is something of a semantic
obstacle to overcome. After Crawford, some federal courts maintain that the
concept of opposition requires that the employ'ee "communicate her belief that
discrimination is occurring to the employer."' 54The Crawfordplaintiffnot only
145. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65.
146. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend, supra note 130, at 958-59 (discussing whether
one employee who provides information to another employee about filing an internal complaint
has engaged in protected opposition conduct).
147. Sawicki v. Am. Plastic Toys, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 910, 913 (E.D. Mich. 200 1).
148. Id. at 913-14.
149. Id.
150. Idat916.
151. Id.
152. Idat 918.
153. Idat 917-18.
154. Demers v. Adams Homes of Nw. Fla., Inc., 321 F. App'x 847, 852 (11Ith Cir. 2009)
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communicated the discrimination, but provided a "disapprovin acuto
sexually obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee."' In contrast,
the Sawicki plaintiff's actions were more neutral in character; the plaintiff
simply passed along a memo and stated, in an apparently neutral tone, that the
coworkers were consulting an attorney. 5 To use some of the synonyms
mentioned in Crawford,157 it is difficult (although perhaps not impossible) to
conclude that the supervisor's actions demonstrated "resistance" or
"antagonism" to her coworkers' treatment. Therefore, it is far from clear that
the result in this case would be any different after Crawford. However, by
helping to facilitate the employees' internal complaint (p~erhaps for the
protection of her subordinates and to her own possible detriment), the
supervisor's actions are exactly the type of behavior that the courts and Title
V11 ought to encourage. Until courts are willing to declare that this sort of
assistance is covered under the participation clause, as well as recognize
coverage for participation in internal grievance procedures, employees will
remain at risk.'5
The failure to treat participation in an employer's internal investigation as
participation conduct may also leave employees whose job requires
involvement in these types of proceedings vulnerable to potential retaliation.
This leaves a potential gap in Title VII for employees who may play a vital role
in helping bring discrimination to the attention of their employers. For example,
in another case, a supervisor oversaw the division that was responsible for
investigating claims of sexual harassment' 59 After meeting with the
complaining employee, the supervisor prepared a written memorandum for his
boss documenting that he had met with the complaining employee, that a
complaint was imminent, and that he had advised the complaining employee of
the proper procedures to follow in pursuing her complaint.160 In addition to his
written memorandum, the supervisor also gave the complaining employee the
phone number of the EEOC and verbally warned his boss that a complaint
addressing harassment and a hostile work environment was forthcoming.' 1' A
few months later, the supervisor was discharged, allegedly in retaliation for his

(quoting Webb v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (S.D. Fla. 1998)).
155. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2009).
156. See Sawicki, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14.
157. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850 ("The term 'oppose,' being left undefined by the
statute, carries its ordinary meaning: 'to resist or antagonize . .. ; to contend against; to
confront; resist; withstand."' (citations omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1710 (2d. ed. 1958))).
158. Cf Muir v. Chrysler L.L.C., 563 F. Supp. 2d 783, 789 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (holding,
pre-Crawford, that providing relevant addresses of company officials to coworker for
coworker's use as part of an internal complaint is not protected opposition conduct).
159. Guess v. City of Miramar, 889 So. 2d 840, 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
160. Id. at 847.
16 1. Id. at 845.
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actions. 162 Consistent with the prevailing interpretation of § 704(a), the court
ruled that the supervisor's actions did not constitute protected participation
6
conduct because they predated the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC.1 1
Moreover, the court held that the supervisor's actions were not substantial
enough to amount to opposition conduct.'16 As was the case in Sawicki, the
plaintiff's actions, on their face, were neutral in character and did not amount to
"confrontation" or "resistance" to the employer's conduct.165
Interestingly, the ADA 61 6 would likely provide protection for an employee
who similarly assisted a coworker in an internal grievance. Under the ADA, it
is unlawful for an employer "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any individual. ...on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any
other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of[] any right granted or protected
by this chapter."167 This language has been interpreted to protect employees
who speak to their employers on behalf of a coworker with a disability who
needs a reasonable accommodation.16 8 Since an employee has a right to oppose
unlawful discrimination by complaining internally, it stands to reason that an
employee who assists a coworker in the exercise of this right-say, for
example, by retyping a memorandum and presenting it to the employer-should
also be protected, regardless of whether the assisting employee "opposed" the
employer's unlawful conduct. Unfortunately, there is no analogue under Title
vii.
The participation clause provides more expansive retaliation protection
than the opposition clause for an additional reason. When an employee claims
protection under the opposition clause, most courts require the employee to
have a good faith, reasonable belief that the conduct the employee opposed was

unlawful under Title

VII.'169

In contrast, a number of courts, citing the

162. Id
163. Id. at 847.
164. Id But see Baranek v. Kelly, Civ. A. No. 85-0376-C, 1987 WL 17546 (D. Mass.
1987) (holding that employee who, as part of her job, assisted in an internal investigation of
discrimination complaint had engaged in protected participation conduct).
165. Guess. 889 So. 2d at 847. Of course, employees whose jobs involve processing
internal complaints must be careful that their opposition is not too substantial. Opposition
conduct that is unnecessarily disruptive is not protected. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worcester
Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222,231-32,233 (1st Cir. 1976). In several cases,
employees whose jobs entailed handling internal discrimination complaints were unable to
claim protection under the opposition clause because their active opposition positioned them
adversely to the employer and left them unable to perform their jobs, namely assisting their
employers in resolving the complaints. Holden v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 793 F.2d 745, 753 (6th Cit.
1986); Smith v. Singer Co., 650 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1981).
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
167. Id. § 12203(b).
168. Barker v. Int'l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 16 (D. Me. 1998).
169. See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1125 (8th Cir. 2006);
Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000); Trent v. Valley Elec.
Ass'n, 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
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importance of preserving access to Title VH1's statutory remedial mechanisms,
have held that coverage under the participation clause does not depend on the
reasonableness of the employee's belief that the employer's actions are
70

unlawful.1

Because many courts have adopted a rather strict conception of what a
VII,'17 ' this distinction is
potentially quite significant for those who instigate internal discrimination
complaints. For example, in one recent case from a federal court in Tennessee,
an employee claimed that he was retaliated against after he encouraged his
coworkers to complain to management about a sujB ervisor' s threat to send
another employee onto a "crew with the niggers."' 2The court held that no
reasonable employee could believe that this statement was unlawful under Title

"reasonable" employee would believe about Title

73
VI.'1

Accordingly, the employee's actions were not protected under the

opposition clause.
Finally, Crawfordalso leaves open the question of whether an employee's
"4silent opposition" can qualify as protected opposition conduct. In attempting
to flesh out the meaning of the word "oppose" in § 704(a), the Court cited with
approval a dictionary definition, which defined the term, in part, to mean "'.to
be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion."", 74 As an example, the Court suggested
that one could "'oppose' capital punisment ... without writing public letters,
taking to the streets, or resisting the government."'17 5 In his separate concurring
opinion, Justice Alito suggested that the Court's expanded definition of
"opposition" might enable employees who had expressed general opposition to
an employer's practices to coworkers or others, but not to the employer directly,
to claim protection under the opposition clause.17 6 If word of this opposition
somehow reached the employer through indirect channels, Alito expressed
concern that an employee could create a genuine issue of fact on the question of
causation as a result of the timing of the employer's adverse action. 17Applying
the Court's expanded definition of "opposition" to these cases "would be
especially problematic because of uncertainty regarding the point in time when
the employer became aware of the employee's private expressions of
disapproval."17 8 Moreover, Justice Alito voiced apprehension that an expansive
170. See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating
that the participation clause protects an employee even "if the contents of the charge are
malicious or defamatory as well as wrong").
171. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18,99 (2005) (criticizing the courts'
application of this standard as being too narrow and too strict).
172. Thomas v. Grinder & Haizlip Constr., 547 F. Supp. 2d 825, 827 (W.D. Tenn. 2007).
173. Idat831.
174. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2009) (citing RANDOM
HOUSE DICTioNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at85 1.
Id at 854 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 854-55.
Id. at 855.

13 59 (2d ed. 1987)).
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view of opposition conduct would contribute to an increase in the alreadygrowing number of retaliation claims filed each year.'179 Therefore, Alito wrote
separately in Crawford to note that "[tlhe question of whether the opposition
clause shields employees who do not communicate their views to their
employers through purposive conduct [was] not before [the Court].' 0
Justice Alito's concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas,
leaves open the question of whether an employee must oppose an employer's
unlawful practices with the purpose of communicating that opposition to the
employer. For example, would an employee be protected if she did not direct
her opposition at the employer, but nonetheless knew with substantial certainty
that the employer would learn of her opposition? Would an employee who had
less certainty that an employer would learn of her opposition be protected, such
as in the case of an employee who did not intend for her opposition to reach the
ears of the employer, but who was at least aware of the possibility that it
might?''
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, was confronted with
such a case in 2009. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, an
employee helped a coworker-who also happened to be his fiancde-prepare
and file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.182 Three weeks after the
EEOC informed the employer of the discrimination complaint, the employee
was terminated.183 Although the employee did not directly communicate to the
employer that he had assisted his flancee in filing the complaint, several
coworkers were aware of that fact. 184 Therefore, it seems entirely plausible that
the employer learned of the employee's active opposition to the alleged
discrimination through the company grapevine and that such a result was
foreseeable to the employee. It does not appear that the employee's purpose
was to convey his opposition to the employer, however. Relying on Justice
Alito's concurrence, the Sixth Circuit85stated that "Crawfords reach does not
extend to the present circumstances."'1
2. Implications for State Law and Possible Alternatives
Like § 704(a), most state anti-retaliation provisions contain distinct
opposition and participation clauses, with participation conduct typically linked
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Justice Auito provided the example, among others, of an employee who expresses
opposition at a restaurant frequented by coworkers. Id. at 854.
182. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 823 (6th Cur. 2009) (en banc)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 806 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 823 n.7 (Moore, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 813 (majority opinion). In an unusual twist, the Sixth Circuit seemed to say both
that the plaintiff had forfeited any argument that he engaged in protected activity through this
action and that this argument was foreclosed by Crawford. See id. at 813-14.
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specifically to a proceeding or hearing "under this chapter" or "under this
article."' 8 6 Relying on the federal courts' interpretation of § 704(a), some states
have concluded that their own participation clauses do not cover employees
who have made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in an internal
investigation procedure. Instead, these actions are covered under the opposition
clause. 18 Thus, if anything, the Court's decision in Crawford to classify
involvement in an internal investigation as opposition conduct-as well as its
decision to altogether avoid attempting to define the contours of the
participation clause-is likely to encourage state courts to follow a similar
88

approach.'1

There is at least some reason to believe, however, that some employees
who participate in an internal grievance procedure, but who do not engage in
what can be deemed "opposition" conduct, may be able to find protection under
their state's parallel anti-retaliation provision. As was previously mentioned,
some state statutes specifically require courts to construe the language of antiretaliation provision in a liberal manner, thus increasing the odds that conduct
that might not be protected under federal law would be protected under state
law.'189 And until the Supreme Court definitively resolves the issue, state courts
should not feel compelled to follow the lead of most federal courts merely for
the sake of uniformity. Instead, state courts should be willing, where
appropriate, to initiate dialogue as to the proper approach for protecting
employees who participate in or otherwise facilitate internal investigations.
Other employees may find that slight differences in their jurisdiction's
statutory language may provide greater protection from retaliation.' 90 In Texas,
for instance, employers are prohibited from retaliating "against a person who,
under this chapter: (1) opposes a discriminatory practice; (2) makes or files a
charge; (3) files a complaint; or (4) testifies, assists, or participates in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing."' 9 ' Section 704(a) of Title
VII limits protection to participation conduct in conjunction with investigations,
186. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 5-11 -9(7)(C) (2002) (declaring that it is an unlawful
discriminatory practice to "[e]ngage in any form of reprisal or otherwise discriminate against
any person because he or she has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this article or
because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this
article.").
187. See, e.g., Guess v. City of Miramar, 889 So. 2d 840, 846-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
188. See Hughes v. Miller, 909 N.E.2d 642,651 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (holding, in light of
Crawford, that filing an internal grievance qualifies as opposition conduct but refusing to
consider whether it qualifies as participation conduct). Other courts, while concluding that
complaining internally is protected activity, have failed to clarify' whether the activity is
protected under the opposition or participation clause. See, e.g., VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970
P.2d 906, 921 (Alaska 1999).
189. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
190. See infra app., tbl.V (listing miscellaneous provisions in state anti-retaliation statutes,
some of which might arguably be read to cover participation in an internal proceeding).

191.

Tcx. LAB. CODE ANN.

§ 21.055 (Vernon 2006) (emphasis added).
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proceedings, or hearings "under this subchapter."' 9 2 Federal courts have seized
on the "under this subchapter" language to conclude that only participation in a
lawsuit or EEOC proceeding is protected.193 In contrast, the "under this
chapter" language of the Texas Human Rights Act is not restricted to any
particular activity.' 94 Thus, on its face, the language would seem to cover one
who testifies, assists, or participates in an internal investigation. Indeed, several
Texas appellate court decisions have interpreted the language in this fashion.' 95
Similarly, South Dakota's statutory anti-retaliation provision is not limited to
participation in a proceeding initiated pursuant to a discrimination statute.
Instead, South Dakota prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
employee who has "fil[ed] a charge, testiflied] or assist[ed] in the observance
96
and support of the purposes and provisions of this chapter."
Still other employees may find that their jurisdiction's anti-retaliation
provision plainly provides greater protection than does § 704(a). Like the ADA,
some states prohibit an employer from intimidating, threatening, or interfering
with an individual in the exercise of a right provided by the statute or because
the individual has aided or encouraged another in the exercise of a right
provided by the statute.'197 However, unlike the ADA, the protection of these
statutes is not limited to those who oppose or file charges concerning disability
discrimination. Instead, the statutes provide a right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.
Therefore, an employee who participates in an internal investigation procedure
concerning another employee's discrimination claim or who, in some manner,
helps to bring the employee's allegations to the employer's attention may have

192. 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
193. See, e.g., Morris v. Boston Edison Co., 942 F. Supp. 65, 69-71 (D. Mass. 1996)
(discussing the significance of this language in concluding that participation in an internal
investigation does not constitute protected participation conduct).

194.

Tnx. LAB. CODE AN.N.

§ 21.055. The statute does limit its protection to a person who,

"under this chapter," engages in any of the various listed forms of protected activities. Id.
195. Arguably, this language might be read to protect only those who, in the course of a
lawsuit or other formal proceeding, opposed a discriminatory practice or engaged in some other
listed activity. However, the Texas Supreme Court has rejected this argument and held that an
employee who makes an internal discrimination complaint has engaged in protected activity by
opposing a discriminatory practice. City ofWaco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. 2008);
see also Wilber v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., No. 2-06-093-CV, 2007 WL 2067818, at *1 (Tex. App.
July 19, 2007) (stating that employee who files an informal, internal complaint has "filled] a
complaint" for purposes of Texas's statute); Tex. Dep't of Assistive & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Abraham, No. 03-05-00003-CV, 2006 WL 191940, at *6 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2006) (concluding
that employee who had filed an internal discrimination complaint and participated in subsequent
internal investigation had engaged in protected activity under Texas's statute); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Lane, 31 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding employee who complained
internally about sexual harassment had "file[d] a complaint" for purposes of Texas's statute).

196. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-13-26 (2004).
197. See infra app., tbl.IV.
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aided the complaining employee in the exercise of a right provided by the
statute and should be entitled to protection.
This is an area in which state law may serve as a useful model for federal
reform. Courts and legislatures should encourage individuals to assist their
coworkers in the exercise of their statutory right to be free from discrimination.
This is as true for victims of race, sex, and other forms of discrimination as it is
for victims of disability discrimination. However, as Title VII is currently
interpreted, employees who assist their coworkers in making internal
complaints of discrimination are vulnerable to retaliation. In this respect,
jurisdictions that employ anti-retaliation language that parallels that of the ADA
may serve as models of reform for Congress in light of the under inclusiveness
currently plaguing Title VII.
C. Third-PartyRetaliation
BurlingtonNorthern extended the protection of § 704(a) to cover situations
in which an employer retaliates against an employee in a manner that has no
direct bearing on the terms and conditions of employment.19 8 However, the
decision fails to fully close a potentially large gap in § 704(a)'s coverage. In a
surprising number of cases, employees have accused employers of retaliation
for engaging in protected activity by taking action against a coworker who is
also a friend or relative. 99 The question of whether these coworkers have a
retaliation claim remains open under federal law.20
198. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2009).
199. See Long, The Troublemaker'sFriend, supra note 130, at 934 n.10 (citing third party
retaliation cases); see also Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (holding that fianc6 of coworker who filed a discrimination complaint was not
entitled to statutory protection unless he himself had engaged in protected activity); EEOC v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1242, 1246-47 (D.N.M. 2008) (holding that
children of employee who had engaged in protected activity had no retaliation claim resulting
from employer's failure to hire them); Freeman v. Barnhart, No. C 06-04900 JSW, 2008 WL
744827, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008) (holding that African-American employee who
associated with other African-American employees who had filed EEOC complaints had not
engaged in protected activity); Mutts v. S. Conn. State Univ., No. 3:04 CV 1746(MRK), 2006
WL 1806179, at * 11 (D. Conn. June 28,2006) (holding that wife and coworker of an employee
who filed a discrimination complaint did not engage in protected activity). In one unusual case,
a wife was allegedly fired because her husband, who was a lawyer, filed a discrimination claim
on behalf of his client against the wife's employer. Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Area
Technical Coll., No. 08-cv-320-bbc, 2008 WL 4379298, at * 1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 23,2008). The
court held not only that the wife could not claim protection from retaliation by virtue of her
husband's protected activity, but also that her husband's activity was not protected because the
lawsuit that be filed on behalf of his client was frivolous. Id. at *4-..5 Thus, he lacked the
requisite reasonable belief that the conduct that was the subject of his lawsuit was unlawful. Id.
at *5.
200. The issue has come up under other federal statutes as well. Elsensohn v. St. Tammany
Parish Sheriff's Office, 530 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (decided under the Family and
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1. Unresolved Issues Under Title VII1
Under § 704(a), it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an
employee or applicant "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employmnent practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.",2 0 1 Read literally, § 704(a) only protects those
employees who have engaged in protected conduct, not those who are
associated with those employees .2 02 The majority of courts have concluded,
based on the plain language of § 704(a), that the coworker of an employee who
has engaged in protected conduct has no recourse through a retaliation claim
simply by virtue of his or her association with the complaining employee. 0
The problem with this interpretation is that it would, in the words of one court,
"'.defeat the plain purpose"' of Title VII by allowing employers to deter
employees from complaining about unlawful conduct by subjecting their
friends and relatives to retaliation .2 04 Taking action against a friend or loved
one is a highly effective way of discouraging an employee from opposing
unlawful conduct and filing a complaint under Title VIII's statutory
framework. 0
Indeed, the fact that retaliation against one's friends or loved ones is such
an effective deterrent to engaging in protected activity has led several courts to
conclude that an employee who engages in protected activity may be able to
claim protection under Burlington Northern's material adversity standard. 0
Ironically, this conclusion actually appears to have influenced courts to
conclude that the friend or relative did not have a viable retaliation claim,
reasoning that the availability of a claim on the part of the employee engaging
in protected activity1 obviates the need to recognize a claim on the part of the
friend or relative.2 The problem with limiting recovery to the complaining
employee lies in the remedy. In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the
friend or relative will have either lost or been denied a job, a harm likely to be
more substantial than the emotional distress the complaining employee may
have endured after seeing a friend or family member punished for her

Medical Leave Act); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1 st Cir. 1989) (decided
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006) (emphasis added).
202. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend, supra note 130, at 950.
203. Id. at934&n.l0.
204. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644,647 (6th Cir. 2008). rev 'den banc,
567 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2009).
205. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568-69 (3d. Cu. 2002).
206. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827-28 (White, J., dissenting); Freeman v. Barnhart, No. C
06-04900 JSW, 2008 WL 744827, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008); Mutts v. S. Conn. State
Univ., No. 3:04 CV 1746(MRK), 2006 WL 1806179, at *11I (D. Conn. June 28, 2006).
207. See Mutts,2006 WL 1806179, at *11.
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actions. 0 Therefore, the majority approach prevents the party who has suffered
the more tangible and likely greater harm from obtaining compensatory and
possibly punitive damages. While allowing the employee who has engaged in
protected activity to recover under a retaliation theory certainly furthers the
policies underlying § 704(a), it is not nearly as effective a deterrent to employer
retaliation as is permitting the friend or relative who has suffered the more
tangible harm to bring his or her own claim.
There are potentially other ways in which courts could effectively prohibit
this kind of third-party retaliation that are just now starting to be explored at the
federal level. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, Lp, 2 09 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with a situation in which the plaintiff
was fired after his fiancee (who also happened to be a coworker) filed a
discrimination charge with the EEOC.2 1 Relying on the plain language of §
704(a), the Court concluded that since the plaintiff had not alleged that he
himself had opposed an unlawful practice or participated in an EEOC
proceeding, he had no retaliation claim .21 1 However, the court was also forced
to wrestle with an additional argument for why the plaintiff should be
protected. While the language of § 704(a) defines what kind of employer
activity is prohibited, the statute also authorizes a court to award relief to "an
aggrieved person." 2 12 Although the plaintiff in Thompson may not have
engaged in protected activity (or at least failed to allege it), he was nonetheless
aggrieved by the employer's act of retaliating against his fiancee, who had
actually engaged in protected activity. The majority opinion quickly glossed
over this issue, but Judge Rogers, in a separate concurrence, took the time to
argue specifically that the "aggrieved person" language should not be expanded
to include employees like Thompson, who were not the "intended

beneficiaries" of Title VII. 21 1 In her dissent, Judge Moore took issue with the
idea that a person who loses a job because of retaliation directed at another is
not within the class of persons protected by § 704(a). 1
Another way courts could effectively prohibit third-party retaliation would
be to award reinstatement, with back pay, to the third party who was fired in
retaliation for another employee's protected activity. If, as both the majority and
dissent seemed to agree in Thompson, the plaintiff's fiancee had a viable
retaliation claim based on the plaintiff's firing 21 ' reinstatement of the plaintiff
208.
209.
210.
211.

Long, The Troublemaker's Friend, supra note 130, at 980.
Thompson, 567 F.3d 804.
Id.at 806.
Id. at 811.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), -5(e)(1) (2006).
213. Id. at 817 (Rogers, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 821-22 (Moore, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 826 (White, J., dissenting) ("All members of the en banc panel appear to
agree that the firing of an employee's co-worker-spouse (or co-worker-fiancee) in retaliation for
the employee's opposition to an unlawfuil employment practice is unlawful under § 704(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).").
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might be the only appropriate remedy. In analogous cases brought under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), courts have upheld the NLRB's

decision to grant this form of relief.216 In her dissent, Judge Moore raised
reinstatement of the third party as a possible remedy for the party who engaged
in protected activity, but noted that it was unclear whether such relief would be

available. 217

Interestingly, not every federal statute governing the workplace is as
restrictive in its language as §704(a). In addition to an anti-retaliation provision
that parallels §704(a), the ADA contains language declaring it unlawful for an
employer "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or
enjoyed, .. . any right granted or protected by this chapter." 218 Because action
against a friend or family member may be an attempt to "coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere" with an employee's exercise of the right to oppose
unlawful discrimination, at least one court has concluded that this language
prohibits an employer from taking action against the relative of an employee
who filed a disability discrimination claim.9
2. Implications for State Law and Possible Alternatives
The problem of third-party or associational discrimination is another
situation in which state courts and legislatures may have a role to play. As is the
case with §704(a), most states employ statutory language that, read literally,
requires that the person retaliated against also be the person who engaged in
protected activity. 220 As has been the case in the federal system, the majority of
state courts to consider the question have concluded that the friend or relative
of an employee who has engaged in protected activity does not have22a
retaliation claim unless she has actually engaged in protected activity herself. '
But once again, state courts need not fall in lockstep with federal courts on
this issue. The federal courts are now beginning to confront more sophisticated
arguments concerning whether §704(a) should be read to provide a remedy to
216.
217.

See Long, The Troublemaker's Friend,supra note 130, at 943-44.
Thompson, 567 F.3d at 822 n.5 (Moore, J., dissenting).

218. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2006).
219. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 570 (3d Cir. 2002).
220. See infra app., tbls.I-III.
221. Gagliardi v. Ortho-Midwest, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 171, 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Pope
v. Motel 6, 114 P.3d 277,282 (Nev. 2005); Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., 214 S.W.3d 672, 67778 (Tex. App. 2007); see also Milistein v. Henske, 722 A.2d 850, 855 (D.C. 1999) (rejecting
these claims, at least where the plaintiff was not a relative or close friend of the employee
engaged in protected activity). Similar issues have arisen outside of the employment
discrimination context in common claims of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy.
See, e.g., Fortunato v. Office of Stephen M. Silston, 856 A.2d 530,532 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)
(permitting common law retaliatory discharge claim where mother was fired after her daughter
contemplated filing a medical malpractice claim against mother's employer).
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the innocent bystanders of employer retaliation, including the arguments that
these individuals have been "aggrieved" by the employer's action and that
reinstatement should be available as a remedy to the employee who actually
engaged in protected activity. 222 Thus, this is an area in which the courts are
beginning to benefit from the percolation of these issues among other courts.
There is no reason why state courts construing identical or substantially similar
language should not engage in the debate as equal players. 2
In addition, coverage under state law may be a more viable option for some
employees based on the different statutory language. For example, New
Jersey's Law Against Discrimination contains language that parallels the
ADA's prohibition against interference, coercion, or intimidation." As at least
one federal court has held with respect to the ADA's parallel language, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that this language prohibits an
employer from retaliating against the associates of an employee who has

engaged in protected activity.22 Similar language exists in several other states'

anti-retaliation statutes.22
Even more directly on point is Missouri's anti-retaliation measure. In
Missouri, an employer is prohibited from "discriminat[ing] in any manner
against any other person because of such person's association with any person
protected by this chapter." 227 The provision certainly protects employees from
discrimination based on their association with coworkers with disabilities or of
a person who opposes an unlawful employment practice
a different race. 222ut
or participates in a proceeding pursuant to Missouri's employment
discrimination act is also a "person protected by this chapter." 229 Therefore, as
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded when interpreting this
punishing friends and
language, the statute also prohibits an employer from
230
family for the "sins" of the complaining employee.
Here again is a situation in which state law could serve as a model for
federal reform. Instances of third-party or associational retaliation appear to be

222. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
223. See Long. The Troublemaker'sFriend,supranote 130. at 518 (arguing for increased
role of state courts in fleshing out legal arguments that may ultimately reach Supreme Court).
224. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(d) (West 2002).
225. Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1995) (concluding that
New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, which parallels § 12203(b) of the ADA, permidts
claims of third-party retaliation); see also Poveromo-Spring v. Exxon Corp., 968 F. Supp. 219,
226 (D.N.J. 1997).
226. See infra app., tbl.IV.

227.

Mo. Rnv.

STAT.

§ 2 13.070(4) (2000).

228. See Francin v. Mosby, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 619,622 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding
that statute protects individual firom discrimination based on his association with a person with a
disability).

229.

Mo. Rnv.

STAT.

§ 2 13.070(2), (4).

230. See Sweeney v. City of Ladue, 25 F.3d 702, 703 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that statute
prohibits retaliation in these cases).
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a problem that Congress simply overlooked when considering Title VLI.2 3
Courts have suggested several reasons why Congress might have deliberately
chosen not to provide protection for the associates of employees who engage in
protected activity, most notably the concern that providing protection for these
individuals would potentially subject employers to a barrage of frivolous
lawsuits from coworkers throughout the workplace. 3 The experience of those
jurisdictions that have allowed these claims suggests that these concerns are
vastly overstated. 3 For example, there is currently only one reported decision
involving a claim of third-party or associational retaliation under Missouri's

anti-retaliation statute 234 a statute that has been in effect since 1992 .235 Even
assuming more employees were to claim retaliation based on the protected
activities of another, they would still need to establish that the other employee's
activities were a legal cause of the retaliation. This is no easy task; for example,
in the one and only reported case applying Missouri's anti-retaliation provision
to a case of alleged third-party or associational discrimination, the party
236
alleging retaliation lost on the causation element.
This is an area where the states can (and in at least one instance have
actually tried to) take the lead and initiate a dialogue with Congress. In 2008,
legislation was introduced in the California legislature to address this form of
third-party or associational retaliation. 3 Under Senate Bill 1244, employers
would have been prohibited from discriminating against an employee or
applicant for employment because a coworker or immediate family member, as
defined, has filed a claim with or instituted a proceeding before the Labor
Commissioner relating to the coworker's or immediate family member's rights,
because the coworker or immediate family member testifies or will testify in
that proceeding, or because the coworker or immediate family member
exercised, on behalf of himself, herself, or others, rights afforded employees or
applicants by the Labor Code.2 3
Despite the failure of Senate Bill 1244 to become law, the bill's
introduction reflects a noteworthy response by some legislators to the
shortcomings of Title VII with respect to third-party or associational
discrimination. Indeed, this is not the first time the California legislature has
231. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that
Congress' failure to provide protection for third parties was the result of "pure oversight").
232. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 570 (3d Cir. 2002).
233. See Thompson v. N. Anm. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644,649 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'den
banc, 567 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that a prior decision within the circuit opened
the door to potentially frivolous claims in 1993, but "very few cases asserting a similar cause of
action have been seen").
234. Sweeney, 25 F.3d at 703.
235. Mo. REv. STAT. § 2 13.070 (2000).
236. Sweeney, 25 F.3d at 704.
237. S.B. 1244, 2007-2008 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 2008), availableat http://www.legmnfo.ca.
govfpub/07-O8Ibill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1244_bill_20080407_amended-sen-v98.pdf
238. Id.
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considered whether to reject the dominant federal approach to a civil rights
issue. In 2000, California amended its FEHA in response to a series of
controversial Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ADA in a restrictive
manner. 239 The new law singled out these decisions and specifically rejected
them, providing that California's statute should be interpreted more broadly. 4
California's high-profile decision to reject the prevailing interpretation of the
ADA for use in its own disability discrimination statute added to the chorus of
criticism concerning the ADA that ultimately led Congress to pass the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 and was cited frequently in the public debate
24
concerning the problems with the ADA's definition of disability. '
IV. STATE COMMON LAW AM) STATUTORY PROTECTION OF INTERNAL
WHISTLEBLOWERS

The Supreme Court's recent retaliation decisions may potentially cast a
long shadow. Already the decisions are having ripple effects beyond the
employment discrimination context. For example, several federal courts have
wrestled with the issue of whether Burlington Northern's material adversity
standard should apply to the whistleblower protection and anti-retaliation
provisions contained in other federal statutes, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) 242

and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act

(USERRA). 4 The same issue has also emerged under state whistleblower
protection statutes that are not necessarily limited to the employment
discrimination setting. 2 "4Perhaps then, the decisions may cause states to re239.
240.
241.

See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926.1 (West 2005).
Id § 12926.1(a).
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; see also Center
& Imparato, supra note 29, 329-31 (proposing a statutory amendment to the ADA's definition
of disability based, in part' on California law); David G. Webbert, In Defense of Whitney, 22
ME. B.J. 104, 105 (2007) (arguing in favor of a broader definition of disability and citing
California as an example of a state that provides for broader protection of individuals with
disabilities).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006); Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 476 n.2
(5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the Burlington Northern standard applies to SOX
whistleblower claims).
243. 38 U.S.C. § 4311l(b) (2006); Crews v. City of Mt. Vernon, 567 F.3d 860,869-70 (7th
Cir. 2009) (relying on Burlington Northern to conclude that an "adverse employment action"
under USERRA must be materially adverse before it is actionable).
244. See, e.g., Rutledge v. SunTrust Bank, 262 F. App'x 956, 958 (11Ith Cir. 2008)
(adopting BurlingtonNorthern'smaterial adversity standard for claims brought under Florida's
Whistleblower Protection Act, which prohibits an employer from taking a "retaliatory personnel
action" against an employee who objects to or refuises to participate in an employer action "in
violation of a law, rule, or regulation"); Montgomery County v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610,614-IS
(Tex. 2007) (adopting Burlington Northern's material adversity standard for use in state
whistleblower protection statute, which covers public employees who report violations of the
law to appropriate authorities); see also Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 731
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evaluate the limited protection they generally afford to internal whistleblowers.
Generally speaking, those who raise concerns internally about what they
believe to be unlawful conduct are less likely to receive protection from the law
than are those who raise concerns externally. This is as true for employees who
blow the whistle on their employers' violation of criminal law as it is for
employees who blow the whistle about unlawful discrimination under Title VII.
Although most jurisdictions have adopted whistleblower-protection statutes or
have adopted a public policy exception to the at-will employment rule that
affords protection to employees who report illegal or unethical conduct on the
part of their employers, external whistleblowers are more likely to receive
protection than are internal whistleblowers.
The majority of state whistleblower statutes provide no explicit protection
for public employees who make only internal reports of suspected illegal
activity.24

Similarly, private employees who make external reports of

wrongdoing to law enforcement or other outside agencies are more likely to
have success on their common law claims of retaliatory discharge in violation
of public policy than are employees who make internal reports." Where the
discharge of an employee somehow offends public policy, most courts have
been willing to recognize a common law exception to the employment at-will
rule.24 Some jurisdictions have limited the public policy exception to situations
in which an employee is discharged for seeking to obtain some benefit to which
he is statutorily entitled (such as worker's compensation benefits) or for
refusing to commit an illegal act.2 4 Others have also been willing to recognize
an exception where an employee is fired for reporting suspected illegal
activity.24 However, even when courts have recognized this type of
whistleblower exception to the at-will rule, they have sometimes expressed
reluctance in recognizing a cause of action where an employee only raises
concerns about unlawful conduct on an internal basis.25
N.W.2d 836, 842 n. 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (questioning whether prior case law under
Minnesota's whistleblower statute remained good law in light of Burlington Northern).
245. What Price Free Speech?: Whistleblowers and the Garcetti v. Ceballos Decision:
HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Stephen M.
Kohn, Chair, Board of Directors, National Whistleblower Center) (stating that 58% of state
whistleblower statutes provide no explicit protection for internal whistleblowers).
246. See House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 556 A.2d 353, 357 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (summarizing law of other jurisdictions); Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational

Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97

CAL. L. REv.

433, 445-46 (2009)

(noting that courts frequently dismiss retaliatory discharge claims when the employee merely
reports internally); Moberly, supra note 6, at 984 (noting inconsistent treatment of external and
internal whistleblowers).
247. MARK A. RomsrniN ETrAL., EmpLoYmENT LAW 402 (3d ed. 2004).
248. See, e.g., Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 502-03 (7th Cir. 1999)
(summarizing Indiana law).

249.

ROTHsTEIN,

supra note 247, at 449.

250. See id. at 449-50 (noting the difficulties courts face in deciding to recognize claims in
these cases).
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One of the primary concerns influencing judicial decisions in this area is
that an employer's response to an internal complaint about the employer's
actions is merely an internal matter rather than a matter of public concern and a

threat to public policy. 2 51 As such, limiting the employer's ability to take action
in these cases would unduly limit the traditional discretion they en~oy under the
employment at-will rule with respect to their internal operations .25 Other courts
have suggested that providing protection for those who limit their opposition to
suspected illegal behavior on the part of their employers to internal complaints
do not further the public's interest in detection and deterrence to the same
extent as external whistleblowers. 5
Title V11 case law also reflects the belief that external participation conduct
deserves greater protection than does internal opposition conduct .254 This is
certainly understandable in light of the fact that the statute envisions (and
requires) the EEOC's involvement in the remedial process. Title Vil1's remedial
framework would be severely hampered if employees fear retaliation for
providing complaints to the EEOC or participating in an EEOC proceeding. 255
This helps explain why courts have held that an employee who files a charge
with the EEOC or who assists or participates in an EEOC investigation need
not have a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer's conduct was
256
unlawful.
That said, the Supreme Court's decisions in the discrimination and
retaliation contexts over the past decade have recognized the value of internal
resolution of disputes prior to the filing of formal complaints. The trend started
with the Court's decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth2 57 and
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,258 in which the Court stressed that Title VII
should be interpreted so as to encourage internal reporting of alleged
discrimination, thus potentially obviating the need for resort to the courts and
the EEOC. 25 9 The trend continued with the Court's retaliation decisions, all of
which (with one exception) involved pro-employee outcomes in situations
involving retaliation based, at least in part, on internal complaints of
discrimination.26 Especially noteworthy is the fact that in several of these cases

251. Id
252. Lobel, supra note 246, at 446.
253. Id
254. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
255. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-07 (5th Cir. 1969).
256. Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 197 8); PetuWa, 411
F.2d at 1005.
257. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
258. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
259. See supra Part II.B. 1.
260. See supra Part 111. The lone exception was Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931
(2008).
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the Court was willing to read into the statutes in question a prohibition against
retaliation that did not exist on their faces.26
Crawfordrepresents the continuation of this trend. Despite the limitations
of the decision, Justice Souter's opinion in Crawford emphasized that the
decision was consistent with the Court's preference for internal resolution of
discrimination complaints previously expressed in Ellerth and Faragher.6
Indeed, as the Court noted, failing to provide protection to those employees
who provide information to an employer about unlawful discrimination taking
place in the employer's workplace would undermine the Court's previous
attempts in Ellerth and Faragherto promote internal reporting and resolution
of concerns over discrimination.
But many of the Court's observations
concerning the need to protect employees who respond to employer questioning
apply with equal force to employees who come forward of their own volition.
The Court recognized that ...
[ffear of retaliation is the leading reason why
people stay' silent instead of voicing their concerns about [unlawful
conduct]."'26 Failing to afford protection to those who provide information
about unlawful discrimination would frustrate the policy underlying Title VII
by encouraging employees "to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against
themselves or against others. 6 Therefore, properly read, Crawford is the
latest in a series of decisions recognizing the need to protect those who raise
concerns about unlawfuil conduct on an internal basis.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in the employment discrimination
and retaliation contexts are consistent with a growing recognition that the law
should encourage employees to raise concerns about suspected wrongdoing
with their employers internally prior to reporting outside the confines of the
employer .266 In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley' Act (SOX), the
most important corporate reform measure in recent years. SOX not only
provides protection for internal whistleblowers, but attempts to make internal
procedures for the reporting, investigation, and resolution of suspected
corporate misfeasance a fundamental part of the corporate culture. 268 To some
261. See supra Part III.C.
262. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846,852 (2009) (discussing the
"strong inducement" those decisions provide employers to "ferret out and put a stop to any
discriminatory activity in their operations").
263. Id.
264. Id. (quoting Brake, supra note 171, at 20).
265. Id.
266. See generally Lobel, supra note 246, at 435 (arguing that the law should prioritize
"internal resolution over exit, except under extraordinary circumstances").
267. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
268. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1107, 1148 [hereinafter Moberly, SarbanesOxley 's Structural Model] ("Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model might provide a means to
encourage the development of... an ethical corpor~ate culture by mandating both a process for
whistleblowers to follow and a high-level recipient for whistleblower disclosures.").
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extent, therefore, SOX represents Congress' recognition that sole reliance on
external reporting to public agencies is an ineffective means of rooting out
misconduct. 6
Moreover, at least one study has concluded that external whistleblowers are
more likely to face retaliation than internal whistleblowers. 7 One reason for
this is almost certainly the fact that external reporting is more frequentl
considered-by employers and employees alike-to be an act of disloyalty. 2 '
When presented with an effective procedure for making internal complaints of
suspected unlawful conduct, employees generally prefer internal reporting to
external whistleblowing because internal reporting is more consistent with their
own conceptions of loyalty to the employer .272 - Therefore, providing legal
protection to those who raise concerns to their employer on an internal basis
prior to reporting outside the confines of the employer is a more realistic and
efficient means of encouraging employees to help root out wrongdoing. In the
process, it will allow employers to address and remedy the wrongdoing before
the wrongdoing does any greater damage to the individuals at issue and the
public interest more generally.
Perhaps then, the Supreme Court's recent decisions can serve as something
of a catalyst and cause state courts to reconsider their prior reluctance to protect
internal whistleblowers. One of the benefits of having a separate system of state
law regulation of the workplace is that, through the device of common law
retaliatory discharge claims, state courts are able to respond to social problems
and changing circumstances in a more fluid manner than their federal
counterparts, who are more statute-bound. 7 Through the evolving common
law, state courts can more rapidly respond to new developments and devise
effective solutions. Thus, the Supreme Court's recent employment
discrimination and retaliation decisions have the potential to provide state

269. See id. at 1141-50 (discussing benefits of SOX's approach in comparison with prior
models for encouraging whistleblowing).
270. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protectingthe Interests of the Employee, the Organization,and Society, 29 Amv.Bus. L.J. 267,
301-02 (1991).
271. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, A4NCS, and Peace, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 463 & n.42 (2002) ("Studies of whistleblowers indicate that the best
predictor of retaliation is external whistleblowing."); Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley 's Structural
Model, supranote 268, at 1143 (describing "the psyche of the American employee, whose sense
of loyalty to the organization keeps her from reporting misconduct externally, but who may
report internally if encouraged by the organization").
272. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel, supranote 268, at 1142 ("An internal
disclosure channel provides a way for employees to demonstrate their loyalty by disclosing
misconduct without having to report colleagues to 'outside' authorities.").
273. See generally Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13
TouRo L. REv. 595, 601-03 (1997) (noting that, unlike state courts, the jurisdiction of federal
courts is curtailed by statute and noting the dialogue that takes place between state legislatures
and courts concerning the common law and the interpretation of statutes).
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courts with the impetus to reexamine their past reluctance to extend common
law protection to internal whistleblowers.
The Supreme Court's recent discrimination and retaliation decisions should
serve as examples for state courts considering whether to extend common law
protection to whistleblowers in general and internal whistleblowers in
particular. Provided an employee can identify a clear statement of substantial
public policy that would be threatened were a court to permit an employer's
retaliation to stand, the fact that the employee complained internally should not
preclude a common law retaliatory discharge claim. Take the 2008 decision of
Darrowv. Integris Health, Inc. 274 from Oklahoma. The plaintiff in Darrowwas
fired after raising concerns internally about the possible falsification of
documents related to patient care in the home health care field .275 In Support of
his retaliatory discharge claim, the plaintiff pointed to Oklahoma's Home Care
Act, an act that, by its terms, related to public health and safety.2 7 As such, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs reports of records discrepancies impacted
not just the narrow concemns of the employer but the public's interests in
affordable and safe home health care.2 7 The fact that the plaintiff raised his
concerns internally did not make the matter any less a matter of public

concern.27
Courts that have previously recognized common law protection for internal
whistleblowers have cited many of the same salutary effects of internal
whistleblowing mentioned by the Supreme Court and by other commentators.
For example, echoing the Supreme Court's observation in Ellerth about the
desirability of internal resolution of concerns, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
had previously observed that one of the goals of protecting whistleblowers is to
"reduce wrongdoing in a speedy, efficacious manner. 2 79 A federal court
discussing Massachusetts' common law similarly observed that forcing
employees to make external reports of wrongdoing before they could be entitled
to protection "would deprive management of the opportunity to correct
oversights straightaway," thereby resulting in "needless public investigations of
matters best addressed internally in the first instance." 28 0 In addition, courts that
have considered whether to extend common law protection to internal
whistleblowers have also cited the loyalty concerns external whistleblowing
raises28 ' and observed that "internal disclosures are much less disruptive to the
company than external disclosures. 8
274. Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 176 P.3d 1204 (Okla. 2008).
275. Id at 1207-08.
276. Id at 1214.
277. Idatl1215.
278. See id. ("Oklahoma law protects both internal and external reporting of
whistleblowers who rely on an employer's public-policy violation to support an actionable
employment termination.") (emphasis in original).
279. Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463, 468 (Okla. 2001).
280. Sullivan v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 716, 725 (D. Conn. 1992).
28 1. See generally Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 257 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc)
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To be sure, these ideas have percolated through state decisional law for
some time.2 8 But now, no less an authority than the Supreme Court of the
United States has repeatedly expressed its approval of internal reporting of
suspected unlawful conduct prior to external reporting and acted to protect
those employees who engage in such conduct. Perhaps then, the Court's actions
will spur state courts to reconsider the reasons behind their past reluctance to
extend similar protection as a matter of common law.
CONCLUSION

All too often states have taken a backseat when it comes to the law of the
workplace, either by virtue of having been overlooked by federal courts and
employment scholars or as a result of their own willingness to assume a
subordinate role. However, the rise in the number of employment retaliation
claims, the changing attitudes toward employee whistleblowers, and the
increasing number of legal issues involving these matters suggests that there is
a role for states to play in influencing federal law. At the same time, the
Supreme Court's recent decisions involving employment retaliation suggest the
potential for federal law to influence the decision making of state courts and
legislatures in both direct and indirect ways. Hopefully, a meaningful dialogue
may soon develop.

(noting the tension between external whistleblowing and "accepted concepts of employee
loyalty"); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring) (noting that employees usually try to address concerns about unlawful
behavior internally).
282. Barker, 40 P.3d at 468; see also Appeal of Rio Energy Corp.. 607 A.2d 606, 608
(N.H. 1992) (observing that reporting internally allows an employer the opportunity to avoid
harm to its reputation).
283. See Connelly v. Kan. Highway Patrol, 26 P.3d 1246, 1266-67 (Kan. 2001)
(discussing prior analysis of the issue and concluding that internal whistleblowers are
protected).
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APPENDIX
TABLE I: Jurisdictionswith Anti-RetaliationProvisions thatAre Identical
or Nearly Identical to Title VII
Alabama
Arizona
Florida
Kentucky

Louisiana
Nevada
South Carolina
Utah

ALA. CODE § 25-1-28 (2007) (age discrimination
only).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1464(A) (2004).
FLA. STAT. § 760.10(7) (2009).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.280(1) (LexisNexis
2005); Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 802 (Ky. 2004)
(concluding that Kentucky's statutory language is no
broader than Title VH's).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:312(D) (1998) (age
discrimination only).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.340(1) (2007).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80(F) (2005).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102(17), -106(1)(a)(i)
(2005 & Supp. 2009).

TABLE II: Jurisdictionswith Anti-RetaliationProvisions Containing
Language that Arguably Differs from Burlington Northern's "Material
Adversity" Standard
Alaska
California
Connecticut

ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(4) (2008) (unlawful
to "discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate").
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h) (West 2005)
(unlawful to "discharge, expel, or otherwise
discriminate").
CONN. GEN. STAT. §46a-60(a)(4) (2009) (unlawful
to "discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate").

Delaware
Georgia

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(f) (2005) (unlawful
to "discharge, refuse to hire or otherwise
discriminate").
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-3(c) (2008) (unlawful to
"discharge or in any other manner discriminate").

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(2) (Supp. 2007)
(unlawful to "discharge, expel, or otherwise
discriminate").

Illinois

775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-101(A) (2008)
("retaliate" against a person because that person has
engaged in protected activity).

Iowa

IOWA CODE § 216.11(2) (2009) (unlawful to
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"discriminate or retaliate against another person in any
of the rights protected against discrimination by this
chapter").
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a)(4) (2000)
(unlawful to "discharge, expel or otherwise
discriminate").

Maine
Maryland

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(E) (2002)
(unlawful to "discriminate in any manner").
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-606(f)
(LexisNexis 2009) (unlawful to "discriminate or
retaliate").

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(4) (2008)
(unlawful to "discharge, expel or otherwise
discriminate").
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2701(a) (1979) (unlawful
to "retaliate or discriminate").
MINN. STAT. § 363A.15 (2008) (prohibiting
"reprisals," which "includes, but is not limited to, any
form of intimidation, retaliation, or harassment" or "for
an employer to do any of the following with respect to
an individual because that individual has engaged in
[protected] activities . . . refuse to hire the individual;

Missouri
Montana

depart from any customary employment practice;
transfer or assign the individual to a lesser position in
terms of wages, hours, job classification, job security,
or other employment status; or inform another
employer that the individual has engaged in [protected]
activities").
Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.070(2), (4) (2000)
(unlawful to "retaliate or discriminate in any manner").
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301 (2009) (unlawful to
"discharge,
expel,
blacklist,
or
otherwise
discriminate").

Nebraska
New Hampshire

NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1004(3) (2004) (unlawful to
"discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate").
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:19 (2009)
(unlawful to "discharge, expel, or otherwise retaliate or
discriminate").

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7(I)(2) (2009) (unlawful to
"engage in any form of threats, reprisal or
discrimination against any person").
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(e) (McKinney Supp.
2009) (unlawful to "discharge, expel or otherwise
discriminate").
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(a) (2007) ("No person
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North Carolina

North Dakota
Ohio

Oklahoma
Oregon

shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action . .. .)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-18 (Supp. 2009)
(unlawful to "engage in any form of threats, retaliation,
or discrimination")
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 41 12.02(H)(12), (I)
(LexisNexis 2007) (unlawful to "discriminate in any
manner" or to "[c]oerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment
of... any right granted").
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1601(1) (200 1) (unlawful to
"6retaliate or discriminate").
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030(l)(f) (2007) (unlawful
"discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate").

________________to

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(d) (West 2009)
(unlawful to "discriminate in any manner").
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(5) (2003) (unlawful to
in any manner").

________________"discriminate

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont

[Vol.
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S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-26 (2004) (unlawful
to "directly or indirectly; . .. engage in or threaten to
engage in any reprisal, economic or otherwise").
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-301(1) (2005) (unlawful
to "[rletaliate or discriminate in any manner").
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055 (Vernon 2006)
(unlawful to "retaliate[] or discriminate[]").
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(5) (2003)
(unlawful to "discharge or in any other manner

_________________discriminate").

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
________________to

WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.210(1) (2008)
(unlawful to "discharge, expel, or otherwise
discriminate").
W. VA. CODE § 5-1 1-9(7)(C) (2002) (unlawful to
"[elngage in any form of reprisal or otherwise
discriminate")
Wis. STAT. § 11I 1.322(2m) (2007-2008) (unlawful
"dischare or otherwise discriminate").

TABLE III.-Jurisdictionswith Anti-Retaliation Provisions that Arguably
Providefor IndividualLiability
Colorado
_______________

District of
Columbia
_________________prohibited

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1 )(e)(IV) (2009)
(unlawful for "any person" to discriminate against
-any

person who has engaged in protected activity)

D.C. CODE § 2-1402.61(b) (2001) (unlawful for
"6any person" to require, request, or suggest a
practice).
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Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kentucky
Michigan
Montana
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
__________________to

Oregon
_________________any

Pennsylvania
_______________in

Tennessee

Washington
_________________to

West Virginia
_________________for
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IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5911 (2006) (unlawful
for "a person" to discriminate against an individual
for engaging in protected activity).
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-101(A) (2008)
(unlawful for "a person, or for two or more persons to
conspire").
IOWA CODE § 216.11(2) (2009) (discriminatory
practice for "[a]ny person" to "retaliate against
another person").
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.280(1) (LexisNexis
2005) (unlawful for "a person, or for two (2) or more
persons to conspire").
MICH. Comp. LAWS § 37.2701(a) (1979)
(unlawful for "[tlwo or more persons" to conspire to
retaliate or discriminate).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301 (2009) (unlawful
for "a person" to retaliate).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(d) (West 2002)
(unlawful for "any person" to retaliate).
N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7(l)(2) (2009) (unlawful for
''any person or employer'' to retaliate).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-18 (Supp. 2009)
(unlawful for "a person" to be connected in any
manner to threats or reprisals).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 41 12.02(H)(12), (1)
(LexisNexis 2007) (unlawful for "any person" to
retaliate in any manner).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1601(1) (2001) (unlawful
for "a person, or for two or more persons to conspire"
discriminate or retaliate).

OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030(1)(f) (2007)
(unlawful for "any person" to "discriminate against
other person").

43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(d) (West 2009)
(unlawful for "any person" to discriminate or retaliate
any manner).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-301(1) (2005)
(unlawful for "a person or for two (2) or more
persons" to retaliate or discriminate against any other
person).
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.210(1) (2008)
(unlawful for an employer or for any "other person"
retaliate or discriminate in any manner).

W. VA. CODE § 5-1 1-9(7)(C) (2002) (unlawful
"any person" to retaliate in any manner).
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TABLE IV: Jurisdictionswith Anti-RetaliationProvisions that Prohibit
Coercion or Intimidation ofIndividuals who Have Exerciseda Statutory
Right or Have Aided or EncouragedAnother in the Exercise of a Statutory
Right
District of
Columbia
New Jersey
Ohio

D.C. CODE § 2-1402.61(a) (2001).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(d) (West 2002).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H)(12)
(LexisNexis 2007).

TABLE V: MiscellaneousProvisions
Georgia

GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-3(c) (2008) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee covered by
this chapter because such employee has made a
complaint to his employer or any other person or has
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or related to this chapter or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceedings.") (emphasis
added).

Illinois

Missouri

775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-101(A) (2008)
(providing that it is unlawful to "[r]etaliate against a
person because he or she has opposed that which he or
she reasonably and in good faith believes to be
unlawful discrimination") (emphasis added).
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.070(4) (2000) ("It shall be
an unlawful discriminatory practice: . . . (4) To

discriminate in any manner against any other person
because of such person's association with any person
protected by this chapter.").

North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(a) (2007) ("No person
shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action against
an employee because the employee in goodfaith does
or threatens to [engage in protected activity] .

. ..

(emphasis added).

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-18 (Supp. 2009) ("It
is a discriminatory practice for a person . .. to engage

in any form of threats, retaliation, or discrimination
against a person . . . who, in goodfaith, has filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an
investigation, proceeding, hearing, or litigation under
this chapter.") (emphasis added).

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030(1)(f) (2007) ("It is an
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Oregon

__________________so.")

South Dakota

_______________(emphasis

Texas

_______________investigation,

Vermont

_______________(emphasis

Wisconsin

__
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unlawful employment practice: ... (f) For any person
to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against
any other person because that other person has
[engaged in protected activity] or has attempted to do
(em!phasis added).

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-26 (2004) ("It is an
unfair or discriminatory practice for any person,
directly or indirectly; . .. to engage in or threaten to
engage in any reprisal, economic or otherwise, against
any person by reason of the latter's filing a charge,
testifying or assisting in the observance and support of
the purposes and provisions of this chapter.")
added).

TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055(l)-(4) (Vernon
2008) ("An employer, labor union, or employment
agency commits an unlawful employment practice if
the employer, labor union, or employment agency
retaliates or discriminates against a person who, under
this chapter: (1) opposes a discriminatory practice; (2)
makes or files a charge; (3) files a complaint; or (4)
testifies, assists, or participates in any manner in an
proceeding, or hearing.").

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 4 9 5(a)(5) (2003) ("It
shall be unlawful employment practice, .. . (5) For any
employer, employment agency, or labor organization
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate
against any employee because such employee has
lodged a complaint of discriminatory acts or practices
or has cooperated with the attorney general or a state's
attorney in an investigation of such practices, or is
about to lodge a complaint or cooperate in an
investigation, or becausesuch employer believes that
such employee may lodge a complaint or cooperate
with the attorney general or state's attorney in an
investigation of discriminatory acts or practices. ..
added).

WIS. STAT. § I1I1 .322(2m)(d) (2007-2008) ("[lIt
is an act of employment discrimination to do any of
the following: . . . (2m) To discharge or otherwise
discriminate against any individual because of any of
the following: . . . (d) The individual's employer
believes that the individual engaged or may engage in
any activity described in pars. (a) to (c).").

